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THE REPEAT APPOINTMENT FACTOR:
EXPLORING DECISION PATTERNS OF ELITE
INVESTMENT ARBITRATORS
Daphna Kapeliukt

This Article analyzes the judicial behavior of repeatedly appointed arbitrators. Focusing on repeat investment arbitrators,the research empirically
controverts the conventional wisdom that arbitratorstend to render compromise awards and the perception that investment arbitratorsare biased in
favor of investors. The research explores the decision patterns of repeat investment arbitratorson three levels: the tribunalas a whole, the appointment
status of arbitratorson the tribunal, and the individual level. By distinguishing repeat arbitratorsas a group and differentiating between the roles
that they play on a tribunal, this Article seeks to present a more nuanced
understandingof arbitraldecision making. The research shows that repeat
arbitratorsdisplay no biases and no tendencies to "split the difference." It
further shows that repeat presiding arbitratorsare less averse to extreme outcomes than are party-appointed arbitrators. Finally, the research shows that
the arbitrators'decision records, examined individually, do not always display a balanced decision pattern over time. This Article concludes that the
arbitrators'incentive to maintain their reputations as experienced and unbiased experts may lead them to grant an award uninfluenced by the purported
need to satisfy both parties or either one of them.
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INTRODUCTION

Scholars have paid much attention to judicial decision making
and behavior.' In exploring the theoretical aspects of judicial decisions, legal scholars and social scientists have offered diverse models
that analyze and explain judicial decision making, focusing on various
determining factors to assess patterns of judicial behavior.2 In addition to this vast theoretical scholarship, empirical studies have ex-

plored judicial decision making across various types of judges and
courts.3
In stark contrast to the abundance of scholarly writings on judicial behavior, scholars have paid limited theoretical and empirical at-

I

See, e.g., LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OFJUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); RICHARD A.
[hereinafter POSNER, How JUDGES THINK];
Jonathan R. Macey, JudicialPreferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL
STUD. 627 (1994); Richard. A. Posner, Judicial Behavior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1259, 1260 (2005) [hereinafter Posner, JudicialBehavior].
2 See infta Part II.
3 See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)
(providing a general sketch of the literature on empirical analyses of the Supreme Court
and federal appellate courts); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, judicialPartisanshipand
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155
(1998) (demonstrating empirically the conditions under which appellate courtjudges obey
the legal doctrines set out by the Supreme Court); Michael A. Perino, Law, Ideology, and
Strategy in judicialDecision Making: Evidencefrom Securities FraudActions, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 497 (2006) (examining federal district court decisions on securities fraud actions);
Richard L. Revesz, CongressionalInfluence on judicial Behavior? An EmpiricalExamination of
Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1100 (2001) (examining
whether changes in the composition of the two chambers of Congress and the Presidency
affect the ideological divisions on the D.C. Circuit); Rorie Spill Solberg & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Activism, Ideology, and Federalism:judicialBehavior in ConstitutionalChallenges Before the
Rehnquist Court, 1986-2000, 3 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 237 (2006) (evaluating the voting
behavior of justices on the Rehnquist Court in cases raising constitutional challenges to
federal, state, and local legislation).
POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 19-56 (2008)
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tention to the decision making of private judges-namely, arbitrators.
Most empirical studies, mainly in the field of employment and labor
arbitration, have attempted to analyze arbitrators' judicial behavior
primarily through economic spectacles. These studies have ultimately
theorized that, as utility maximizers who wish to increase their
chances of reappointment in future disputes, arbitrators will tend to
satisfy both parties by rendering compromise awards.4 Although these
studies have focused on the tendency to "split the difference,"5 they
have largely overlooked whether repeat arbitrators or newcomers
granted the awards in question.6 That is, while these studies analyze
whether arbitrators tend to render compromise awards in order to
4
See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Privateand Publicjudges, 41 PUB. CHOICE
107, 107-08 (1983) (arguing that "income-maximizing private judges make decisions
which are Pareto efficient with respect to the litigants" and that the competition between
private judges compels them to consider the effects of their decisions upon the actual
litigants exclusively rather than considering third parties); Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 335, 366 (2006)
(arguing that creditors are reluctant to submit disputes to arbitration because they risk
"split the difference" awards); Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial
Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 34 (2008) (arguing that since "arbitrators are commonly
chosen (directly or indirectly) and paid by the parties, giving the arbitrators an interest in
rendering decisions that will maximize the chances that they will be chosen again in future
disputes[,] . .. [arbitrators have] an incentive to render compromised judgments that do
not badly offend either party"); Posner,judicialBehavior, supra note 1, at 1260-61 (arguing
that the demand for the services of an arbitrator who gets a reputation for favoring one
side or the other will wither); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in PrivateJudging, 38 S. TEx. L. REV.
485, 523 (1997) (claiming that, in collective bargaining cases, "[r]epeat business for the
arbitrator is likely only if he is able to retain the future goodwill of both union and management; the desire to do so may give him an incentive (in the hallowed phrase) to 'split
the baby'"); Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute
MandatoryArbitration Agreements at the ContractingStage of Employment, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1203,
1211 (2002) (arguing that "[u]nlike courts and juries, which are more likely to adhere to
the law, arbitrators are more likely to split the difference"); G. Richard Shell, ResJudicata
and Collateral Estoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 UCLA L. REV. 623, 634 (1988)
("Arbitrators, unlike judges, often have an incentive to make disputants equally happy or
unhappy because they are paid by the parties rather than by the state.").
5 See, e.g., David E. Bloom, Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional
Arbitration, 68 REv. ECoN. & STAT. 578, 585 (1986) (finding a systematic tendency of conventional arbitrators to split the difference between parties' final offers); Henry S. Farber &
Max H. Bazerman, The General Basis of ArbitratorBehavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-OfferArbitration,54 ECONOMETRICA 819, 822, 842 (1986) (arguing that arbitrators tend to avoid granting awards that are unacceptable to either party). For studies
testing this myth on international arbitration awards, see Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W.
Naimark, ArbitratorsDo Not "Split the Baby ":Empirical Evidenceftom InternationalBusiness Arbitrations, 18 J. INT'L ARB. 573 (2001); Splitting the Baby: A New AAA Study, Am. ARBITRATION
Ass'N (Mar. 9, 2007), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32004.
6 However, some studies of employment arbitration outcomes have explored the effect of disputing parties as repeat players on arbitral decision making. See, e.g., Lisa B.
Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'vJ. 189
(1997) (examining employee win rates and outcomes when employers are repeat players);
Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in judicial Review ofEmployment ArbitrationAwards, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 223 (1998) (examining empirically whether there is a measurable repeat-player effect in employment arbitration).
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increase their chances of being selected in future disputes, they have
not considered whether the decisions were those of repeatedly appointed arbitrators or those of one-shot arbitrators. Further, the existing empirical studies have not focused on decision patterns of
arbitrators as a function of their role as presiding arbitrators or as
party-appointed arbitrators in three-member tribunals.
As I explain in this Article, a more complete evaluation of arbitral
decision making requires a more nuanced understanding of the arbitrators' incentives, combined with an appreciation of interpanel dynamics. Even if all arbitrators desire to be selected for future cases,
the interests that drive a first-time arbitrator appointed by a claimant
might differ from the interests that drive a repeat presiding arbitrator.
Thus, if the research treats all arbitrators as monotonous, calculating
individuals in the elusive search for the middle ground, it may not
yield the most accurate results. However, no systematic research has
yet been undertaken on the decision patterns of repeat arbitrators.
Attempting to fill a gap in current empirical research, this Article
offers an analytical study of the decision patterns of repeatedly appointed arbitrators. Using empirical tools, this Article systemically
evaluates claims about arbitrators' judicial behavior. It offers an insight into the decision making of repeatedly appointed private judges,
whom this Article calls "elite arbitrators," and explores their decision
patterns as a function of their role in the arbitration tribunal (as partyappointed arbitrators or as presiding arbitrators).
As a modest step towards a comprehensive analysis of arbitrators'
judicial decision-making patterns, and in line with the existing empirical research that has focused on specific groups of judges in specific
courts,7 this Article explores arbitral decision making in investmenttreaty arbitration-a highly lucrative type of arbitration that has
gained much academic attention in the past decade.8 With the rapid
growth of foreign investment,9 there has been a growing number of
7
See, e.g., Perino, supra note 3, at 516-21 (examining federal district court decisions
on securities fraud actions); Solberg & Lindquist, supra note 3, at 246-59 (evaluating the
voting behavior of justices on the Rehnquist Court in cases raising constitutional challenges to federal, state, and local legislation).
8 See generally Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAw
24-44 (2007).
9 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, global foreign-direct-investment inflows amounted to US$618.1 billion in 2002, US$730.2 billion in 2004, and US$1.3351
trillion in 2006. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WORLD INVESTMENT PROSPECTS To 2011:
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF POLITICAL RISK 6 (2007), available at
http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/WIP-2007_WEB.pdf. However, as a result of the financial and economic crisis, global foreign direct investments fell fourteen percent from
US$1.979 trillion in 2007 to US$1.697 trillion in 2008. United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2009: Transnational Corporations,Agricultural Production and Development, at xix, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (Sept. 17, 2009)
[hereinafter UNCTAD, World Investment Report].

2010]

THE REPEAT APPOINTMENT FACTOR

51

investment-treaty conflicts, with most claims consisting of tens and
often hundreds of millions of dollars.10 As a result, investment-treaty
arbitration has been on the rise."
In light of the substantial stakes involved in such arbitrations and
their prominence, one might expect that there would be some systematic empirical research analyzing the decision patterns of investment
arbitrators. Indeed, it stands to reason that researching the judicial
behavior of those whose decisions affect billions of dollars is a worthwhile exercise. Nonetheless, there has been very little empirical research on investment-treaty arbitration, 12 and to date, no empirical
work has offered a comprehensive analysis of the judicial behavior of
elite investment arbitrators. This Article addresses this gap in the
scholarly literature by identifying the major players in this high-profile
field and evaluating their decision-making patterns.
This Article analyzes investment-arbitration awards rendered by
repeatedly appointed arbitrators in arbitrations held under the auspices of the most dominant institution for the settlement of investment disputes-namely, the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID).13 The reason for this method is two
10 See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 57-58 (2007) (finding that the average amount of damages
claimed in the investment-treaty cases analyzed in her research was approximately
US$343.4 million).
See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Latest Developments
11
in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA MONITOR No. 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/
IIA/2008/3 (2008) (claiming that 2007 showed a marked increase in treaty-based investor-state arbitrations); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Latest
Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA MONITOR No. 4, at 1, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/2 (2005) (stating that investor-state arbitrations continue
to grow unabated); Franck, supra note 10, at 46 (claiming that the data "supports the assertion that there has been an increase in the use of investment treaty arbitration"); Barton
Legum, Investment Treaty Arbitration'sContributionto InternationalCommercialArbitration, Disp.
RESOL. J., Aug./Oct. 2005, at 71, 72 (suggesting that "there seems to be a new award every
week").
12 On current empirical research on investment arbitration, see infra Part III.
13
ICSID is an international institution established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, art. 1, Mar.
18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 4 I.L.M. 524 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. Its primary purpose is to provide dispute-resolution facilities for arbitration and conciliation of claims
arising under Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), regional agreements such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), special treaty regimes such as the Energy
Charter Treaty, and ad-hoc situations. See ICSID Dispute Settlement Facilities,ICSID, http://
icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=RightFrame&
FromPage=DisputeSettlementFacilities&pageName=Disp-settl_facilities. The majority of
investment-arbitration cases are brought under ICSID. See generally RUDOLF DOLZER &
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAw 222-25 (2008)

(dis-

cussing the dominant role of ICSID and the ICSID Additional Facility in investment-treaty
arbitration). Some arbitrations are brought under the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules, the rules of the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), or the rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC).
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fold: I aim to shed light on the judicial behavior of those elite international arbitrators who compete in an exclusive market involving highstakes disputes. In addition, I aim to eliminate any claim concerning a
possible divergence in decision patterns of arbitrators serving in tribunals held under the auspices of different institutions. Unlike other
arbitration institutions-such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC)ICSID's policy and practice is to publish arbitration awards,1 4 or at
least to publish the relevant extracts of the legal reasoning of arbitration tribunals.15 The systematic publication of awards by ICSID enables reliable empirical research evaluating decision-making patterns
of elite arbitrators.
This Article explores the decision patterns of elite arbitrators on
three levels: the tribunal as a whole, the appointment status of arbitrators on the tribunal, and the individual level. On the tribunal level,
this Article explores the decision patterns of all publicly available
awards on the merits granted by arbitration tribunals consisting of at
least one elite arbitrator. On the appointment-status level, this Article
assesses the decision patterns of elite arbitrators as a function of their
role in the arbitration tribunal (as presiding arbitrators or as partynominated arbitrators). Given the unique role of presiding arbitrators in the arbitration process,1 6 this Article further analyzes the appointments of elite arbitrators as presiding arbitrators and the
number of settlements that the disputing parties reach in cases over
which these arbitrators preside. Finally, on the individual level, this
Article explores the fluid decision patterns of individual elite arbitrators over time. This research presents a modest step in evaluating this
intriguing issue by offering an insight into the decision making of
elite arbitrators. As such, this Article contributes to the empirical
literature on arbitrators' judicial behavior in general and on investment arbitrators in particular.
Analyzing the behavior of elite investment arbitrators is not just
an academic exercise. The analysis presented below may well have
practical implications for both investors and states in designing their
dispute-resolution strategies and behavior both before and after an
investment dispute arises. Studying decision patterns of investment
14 However, ICSID "shall not publish the award without the consent of the parties."
ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 48(5).
15
See INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INv. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS
AND RULES: RULES OF PROCEDURE

FOR ARBITRATION

PROCEEDINGS (ARBITRATION

RULES)

r. 48(4) (Jan. 2003), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdocen-archive/
ICSIDEnglish.pdf [hereinafter ICSID ARBITRATION RULES] ("The Centre shall not publish

the award without the consent of the parties. The Centre shall, however, promptly include
in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal.").
16
See infra Part II.
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arbitrators may affect the ex ante choice of prospective investors
whether to invest in foreign states who are parties to a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) that provides for ICSID arbitration.1 7 The analysis
may also affect the ex post choice of investors whether to pursue ICSID
arbitration or to opt for other channels of dispute resolution once a
dispute arises. The implications of this research could be very useful,
especially for BITs that offer investors the choice between various
methods of dispute resolution.1 8 Moreover, the findings of this research could serve as guiding determinants for disputing parties in
selecting an arbitrator to hear their case. Understanding the decision
patterns of elite arbitrators could provide parties with insight into
these arbitrators' judicial behavior and enable parties to assess the desirability of selecting elite arbitrators for the tribunal. In addition, the
findings of this research may be of use to both investors and host
states in assessing their propensity to succeed in arbitration and in
reducing their error chances. Since investment arbitration may involve substantial legal fees and arbitration costs,1 9 both parties may
benefit from understanding the pattern of behavior of those in whose
hands they place the outcome of their disputes. These considerations
are particularly important for capital-importing countries since their
potential liabilities, including the cost of defending claims in investment arbitration, may be substantial and potentially affect their entire
economy. 20
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I offers a brief introduction
to investment treaties and investment-treaty arbitration. Part II analyzes the literature on the judicial behavior of arbitrators in general
and on the judicial behavior of investment arbitrators in particular.
The line of studies on arbitral behavior has focused on the arbitrators'
purported tendency to split the difference, whereas the common narrative on investment arbitration has argued that arbitrators tend to
rule in favor of investors. The discussion in this Part stresses that the
17 See infra Part I.
18 For example, some BITs provide alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms, such
as ICSID arbitration, other institutional arbitration, ad-hoc arbitration, or court proceedings. See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 13, at 242-43 (discussing the alternative disputeresolution mechanisms in dispute-settlement clauses in BITs); see also infta Part I.
19 See Franck, supra note 10, at 66-70 (evaluating claims that arbitration costs are substantial and finding that "the parties made approximately equal contributions to the tribunal's costs" and that "tribunals required investors to contribute nearly twice as much as
governments to the opposing party's legal expenses").
20 See Roberto Daflino, Sec'y-Gen. of ICSID, Opening Remarks at Symposium in Paris,
France: Making the Most of International Investment Agreements: A Common Agenda
(Dec. 12, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/headlines.
cfm?reflD=78365) (expressing concern over "the growing cost of arbitration" and suggesting that "[t]his is particularly true for the low-income countries, and for a few small
companies, which cannot afford being represented by the most experienced and sophisticated law firms in the field, as claimants usually are").
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theories behind the decision-making patterns of arbitrators do not
seem nuanced enough and, specifically, that they lack any consideration of the various types of arbitrations and the different roles that
arbitrators play in three-member tribunals.
Part III explores the current empirical research and addresses its
limitations. This Part advances the argument that the empirical studies on arbitral decision making have, so far, overlooked three elements: the relevance of repeat appointment to the analysis of arbitral
behavior; the impact of the role of the arbitrators on the arbitration
panel-as presiding arbitrators or as party-appointed arbitrators-on
arbitral behavior; and the dichotomous coding of winners and losers
in arbitration. With respect to this third element, empirical research
has often coded outcomes on a binary scale, in which the claimant
wins if the arbitrator awards him or her something, and the respondent wins only if the claimant receives nothing. This Article argues
that a more nuanced categorization could provide more accurate information about arbitrators' decision making.
Part IV details the study's methodology. Part V provides information about the population of arbitration cases and elite arbitrators that
this study explores. Part VI presents the findings of the research and
analyzes its results. On the tribunal level, this research finds that elitearbitration awards do not show a tendency to split the difference or to
favor investors. On the contrary, more than half of the awards dismissed all investors' claims. On the appointment-status level, this Article reveals that, contrary to what one might expect, elite presiding
arbitrators dismiss all claims or accept all claims more often than elite
party-appointed arbitrators and are, therefore, less averse to extreme
outcomes than party-appointed arbitrators. The research also finds
that elite arbitrators appointed by respondents display decision patterns that are more in line with those of elite presiding arbitrators
than with those of elite arbitrators appointed by claimants. In fact,
the research shows that claimant-appointed elite arbitrators are more
inclined to award something to claimants than are respondent-appointed elite arbitrators or elite presiding arbitrators. On the individual level, this research finds that the elite arbitrators' decision records,
examined individually on a timeline, do not always display a tendency
towards a balanced decision pattern. A short conclusion follows.
I
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION UNDER ICSID
Foreign investment has experienced a significant expansion in

the past two decades, enabling global economic growth. With billions
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of dollars already invested in countries throughout the world,2 1 the
flow of foreign capital is slated to increase in the coming years. 22 Accordingly, governments may take various steps to attract foreign investment and the influx of capital.2 3 One major instrument affecting
the investment climate around the world and enabling the rapid flow
of foreign capital is the increased number of BITs for the promotion
and protection of investment. 24
By the end of 2008, both capital-exporting and capital-importing
countries had concluded more than 2,670 BITs.25 Most BITs provide
similar substantive provisions that create standards of protection for
those who fall under the definition of "investors" within the treaty
against the actions of the host state in which they invest. 2 6 Typical
See supra note 9.
22 Prior to the global financial crisis at the end of 2008, economists in 2007 projected
that foreign direct investment flows over the next five years would increase, eventually
reaching US$1.604 trillion by 2011. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 9. The
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) more up-to-date report from 2009, which provides an outlook on future trends in foreign direct investment
and accounts for the ongoing economic and financial crisis, expects that recovery will begin slowly in 2010 and gather momentum in 2011. See United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development, World Investment Prospects Survey 2009-2011, at 16, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/8 (2009). UNCTAD explains that the economic crisis has severely affected foreign investment. It expects that investment flows will fall to below
US$1.2 trillion in 2009, with a slow recovery of up to US$1.4 trillion in 2010 and US$1.8
trillion in 2011. See UNCTAD, World Investment Report, supra note 9, at xxi.
23 These steps may include legislative reforms that affect their policies on the costs,
risks, and barriers to competition that firms face. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 4 (2004) (suggesting that
governments can influence the investment climate through "the impact of their policies
and behaviors on the costs, risks, and barriers to competition facing firms"). Governments
may also affect the security of property rights, the regulation of taxation, the functioning of
finance, and the regulation of other broad features of governance. Id. at 19; see also Susan
D. Franck, IntegratingInvestment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design, 92 MINN. L. REV.
161, 171 (2007) (noting that signing investment treaties is a popular governmental tactic to
promote foreign investment).
24
Investment treaties are usually between two governments. By June 1, 2009, the
United States had concluded forty-seven bilateral investment treaties. See Country-Specific
Lists ofBITs, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?inttemlD=2344&lang=1 (select "United States of America" from dropdown menu) (last visited Sept. 20, 2010). Some treaties, however, involve a group of governments. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); see also Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The
Diffusion of BilateralInvestment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 265, 299-300 (finding a decline in the signing of BITs in the period of 2000-2006 as compared to 1960-2000
but an increase in BITs among lower-income countries); Susan D. Franck, Foreign Direct
Investment, Investment Treaty Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, 19 PAc. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus.
& DEV. L.J. 337, 338 (2007) (suggesting that the number of investment treaties has tripled
in the past two decades).
25 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Role of International
Investment Agreements in AttractingForeign Direct Investment to Developing Countries, at 2, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5 (Jan. 12, 2009).
26 On the different substantive rights included in BITs, see, for example, Susan D.
Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: PrivatizingPublic International
21
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BITs offer a wide array of reciprocal undertakings by contracting
countries towards investors, 2 7 such as general obligations toward investors,2 8 general standards for expropriation,29 and currency-transfer
standards.3 0 BITs also include dispute-resolution procedures that enable nonstate entities-corporate and individual investors-to seek redress against the host state for an alleged breach of its treaty
obligations.
In turn, most investment treaties provide for an arbitration mechanism to resolve treaty disputes.3 1 This mechanism enables foreign
investors to institute actions for arbitration against host governments
for an alleged breach of the host government's substantive obligations
under the BIT. 3 2 The host government's consent to the jurisdiction
of an international arbitration tribunal is granted ex ante in the form
of an open offer in either the investment treaty or in its national law.3
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1529-33 (2005). On the issues that should be addressed in BITs, see Eli Lauterpacht, The Draftingof Treaties for the
Protection of Investment, 3 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. (SUPPLEMENTARY PUBLICATION) 18 (1962).
27
See, e.g., Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment (2004), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT].
28 For example, BITs may require national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment,
and minimum standard of treatment. See, e.g., id. arts. 3-5.
29 See, e.g., id. art. 6.
30
See, e.g., id. art. 7.
31
See, e.g., id. art. 24. On the inclusion of dispute-resolution provisions in international agreements, see generally Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of InternationalAgreements
Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189,
205-07 (2007) (showing that international agreements that address complex cooperation
problems are more likely to include dispute-resolution provisions).
32 For example, an investor may claim that the host country did not afford him or her
national treatment or that it expropriated his or her investment without compensation.
See, e.g., 2004 U.S. Model BIT, supra note 27, arts. 3, 6.
33 See, e.g., R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS
AND COMMENTARY 317 (2005) ("ICSID's jurisdiction may now be secured by a unilateral
statement on behalf of a contracting state party to the Washington Convention and may,
also, be incorporated in BITs as well as NAFTA."); DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 13, at
242 ("[T]he states [that are] parties to the BIT offer consent to arbitration to investors who
are nationals of the other contracting party. The arbitration agreement is perfected
through the acceptance of that offer by an eligible investor."). Compare Charles N. Brower
& Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of InternationalInvestment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 490 (2009) (pointing out that the states' consent to
arbitration is "treaty-mandated arbitration without privity, comparable much more to a
form of international administrative review than to purely commercial arbitration, in
which the parties have full sovereignty over the proceeding" (footnote omitted)) and M.
Sornarajah, Power and justice in Foreign Investment Arbitration,J. INT'L ARB., Sept. 1997, at
103, 129-30 ("Conventionally, one must regard a promise to settle disputes unilaterally
made as an invitation to treat rather than as an agreement to arbitrate for no definite party
was in contemplation at the time the unilateral guarantee was made."), withJan Paulsson,
Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REVIEW-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 232, 232 (1995)
(describing a "new world of arbitration" without privity arising through "investment laws,
and in bilateral investment treaties").
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Most dispute-resolution provisions in BITs refer to arbitration at
ICSID.3 4 This fact accounts for the prevalence of ICSID arbitration
for the resolution of investment disputes over other arbitration
institutions.3 5
ICSID has been the leading institution for the resolution of investor-state disputes over the past two decades.3 6 It was established in
1966 as a division of the World Bank to administer disputes between a
state party to the ICSID Convention and a national of another state
that is also party to the Convention.3 7 In addition, the ICSID Additional Facility administers disputes in cases where the Convention's
jurisdictional requirements are not met.3 8
In light of the rapid growth in the number of BITs,3 9 the number
of investor-state arbitrations has escalated dramatically. While ICSID
registered one or two cases each year in its first twenty years, 4 0 the
number of registered cases has increased rapidly in the last two decades. Specifically, the current rate of growth for registered cases is
about 25 per year. 4 1 By December 2009, the total number of cases
registered with ICSID amounted to 305.42 The growth of investment
dispute under the auspices of ICSID creates the need for a thorough
investigation of ICSID arbitration awards.
34
See Lucy REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 4 (2004) (arguing that many, if
not most, BITs provide for ICSID dispute resolution); M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAw ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 251 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that most dispute-settlement provi-

sions in investment treaties point to ICSID arbitration); Christoph Schreuer, Travelling the
BIT Route: Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT
& TRADE 231, 231 (2004) (pointing out that most BITs refer to ICSID); Dahiino, supra note
20 (claiming that, by the end of 2005, there were more than 2,000 BITs, with more than
1,500 providing for ICSID as the forum for the settlement of investment disputes). The
2004 U.S. Model BIT also provides for arbitration under ICSID. See 2004 U.S. Model BIT,
supra note 27, art. 24.
35 Some BITs may provide for dispute resolution before other bodies, such as the ICC
or, for ad-hoc arbitration, under the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules. See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 13, at 225
(noting that, while "ICSID has become the main forum for the settlement of disputes between a foreign investor and the host state ... it is not unusual that BITs leave the investor
with a choice between ICSID and other types of arbitration").
36 See Matthew Wendlandt, SGS v. Philippines and the Role ofICSID Tribunals in InvestorState Contract Disputes, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 523, 531 (2008) ("[W]ith regard to investor-state
disputes, ICSID is the premier arbitration forum.").
37 Id. at 523; see ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 25(1).
38
See INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INv. DISPUTES, ICSID ADDITIONAL FAcILITY RULES
5 (Apr. 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR.English-final.
pdf.
39 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
40

See INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, THE ICSID CASELOAD-STATISTICS

(Issue 2010-1), 7,http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDoc
RH&actionVal=ShowDocument&CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English.
41
Id.
42

Id.
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II
THE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR OF ARBITRATORS
The judicial behavior of public judges has been the subject of
much scholarly research. Scholars have proposed various theories
and models that explain judicial decision making,43 including the legal model, 44 the attitudinal model, 4 5 the strategic model, 46 and the
economic model. 4 7 According to the economic model, every judge
has a utility function that he or she tries to maximize through his or
her behavior." 8 The economic approach to judicial decision making
has offered a typology of various public judges and, by elucidating the
specific characteristics of each and identifying their respective incen43

For a description of the various theories, see, for example, POSNER, How JUDGES

THINK, supra note 1, at 19-56 (mapping the positive theories developed for explaining
judicial behavior); Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of EmpiricalLegal Scholarship:
JudicialDecision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 819, 832-49 (discussing
empirical legal scholarship as a method for understanding judicial behavior).
44 The legal model suggests that judges make decisions based on a reasoned analysis
of sources of legal authority and free from ideological preferences. See, e.g.,JoHN CHIPMAN
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 84-85 (2d ed. 1921); Frederick Schauer,

Formalism, 97 YALE LJ. 509, 544 (1988).
45 The attitudinal model hypothesizes that judges' ideological and political preferences explain their judicial decisions. See, e.g., POSNER, HoWJUDGES THINK, supra note 1, at
19-29; JEFFREY. A. SEGAL & HAROLD

J. SPAETH,

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL

86-97 (2002); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1635, 1678 (1998); Andrew D. Martin et
al., The Median justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1275, 1283-96
(2005); Harold J. Spaeth, The Attitudinal Model in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 296, 296-315
(Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
46 The strategic model posits that judges are strategic actors who are dependent on
choices of other actors and influenced by institutional settings. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN &JACK
KNIGHT, THE CHOICESJUSTICES MAKE 9-18 (1998); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering in judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 735 (2008); Lee
Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society: Playing the
Reconstruction Game, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS, supra note 45, at 315, 315-47; Forrest
Maltzman et al., Strategy and Judicial Choice: New InstitutionalistApproaches to Supreme Court
Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES
43, 43-65 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
47 The economic model considers judges as rational utility-maximizers. See, e.g.,
Cooter, supra note 4, at 129; Christopher R. Drahozal, judicial Incentives and the Appeals
Process,51 SMU L. REV. 469 (1998); Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, JudicialDiscretion,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1980); Posner, Judicial Behavior, supra note 1; Richard A. Posner,
What Do Judges andjustices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON.
REv. 1 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, What DoJudges Maximize]; Frederick Schauer, Incentives,
Reputation, and the IngloriousDeterminants ofjudicial Behavior,68 U. CIN. L. REv. 615 (2000).
48
See, e.g., POSNER, How JUDGES THINK, supra note 1, at 36 (explaining that the elements of the judicial utility-function include "money income, leisure, power, prestige, reputation, self-respect, the intrinsic pleasure (challenge, stimulation) of the work, and the
other satisfactions that people seek in ajob"); Posner, What DoJudges Maximize, supra note
47, at 2. But see Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making,
75 B.U. L. REv. 941, 946 (1995) (arguing that formal attributes of the judicial system are
critical to understanding judicial incentives).
MODEL REVISITED
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tives and constraints, has yielded a projection of how they would perform in rendering their decisions.4 9
In contrast to the wide academic interest in the judicial behavior
of public judges, arbitral decision making has received little attention.5 0 What little scholarly research exists explores judicial behavior
of arbitrators primarily through the economic lens.5 1 Further, in contrast to the economic approach to the behavior of public judges, the
economic approach to arbitral behavior has considered arbitrators as
a single class of private judges. That is, while the behavior of public
judges has been thoroughly analyzed by accounting for the specific
characteristics of each type of judge,5 2 arbitrators have been analyzed
within a single, overarching category.53 This Article takes the view
that such uniform characterization of arbitrators is flawed and that
arbitrators cannot be treated within one generic class. 54
The economic approach to arbitral decision making posits that
arbitrators, like judges, are utility maximizers.5 5 However, due to the
particular characteristics of the arbitration process, the incentives and
constraints of arbitrators differ from those of public judges. While
judges are usually randomly assigned to hear cases and receive a secure income regardless of these assignments and irrespective of the
number of cases they hear, in arbitration, parties generally select arbitrators, and arbitrators receive compensation from these parties only
after their appointment.5 6 Furthermore, unlike public judges, arbitrators often practice as private attorneys who counsel clients in matters
subject to arbitration.5 7 Thus, unlike judges who remain shielded
49
See Posner, judicialBehavior, supra note I (presenting a framework for analyzing the
judicial behavior of private judges, judges in career judiciaries, elected judges, U.S. federal
district judges, federal appellate judges, and Supreme Court Justices, offering predictions
of likely judicial behavior at each level and comparing those predictions with observed
judicial behavior).
50
See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, BehavioralAnalysis of Arbitral Decision Making, in
TOwARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION. COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 319,
319-39 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005) (analyzing heuristics
and cognitive biases in decision making by juries and judges and applying this analysis in
arbitration); Posner, JudicialBehavior, supra note 1, at 1260-62 (analyzing arbitral behavior
according to arbitrators' incentives and constraints).
51
See Posner, JudicialBehavior, supra note 1, at 1260-62 (analyzing arbitral behavior as
part of a broader economic approach to judicial behavior and performance).
52
Id. at 1262-78 (separately analyzing the judicial behavior of career judges, elected
judges, U.S. federal district judges, federal appellate judges, and Supreme CourtJustices).
53
Id. at 1260-62 (analyzing all arbitral behavior under the classification "private
judges").
54
The results of the research that I present in this Article confirm this position.
55
See, e.g., Posner, Judicial Behavior, supra note 1, at 1260-61.
56
Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549, 559 (2003); Susan D.
Franck, The Role of InternationalArbitrators, 12 ILSAJ. INT'L & Comp. L. 499, 509 (2006).
57
See, e.g., YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE 21-22 (1996).
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from market pressures, arbitrators compete in the arbitration market
for business just like any other service provider.5 8 As a consequence,
judges and arbitrators may behave differently and display different decision-making patterns.
The opportunity for the disputing parties to select and appoint

the members of their arbitral tribunal is one of the most attractive
aspects of arbitration.5 9 In fact, the quality of arbitration depends to a
large extent on the quality of the arbitrator.6 0 The selection of arbitrators is therefore an important, if not critical, element of any arbitration. This observation is especially true in large international disputes
where hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake. When a tribunal
consists of a sole arbitrator, the parties or an arbitral institution typically appoints that arbitrator.6 1 In situations where an arbitral tribunal consists of a panel of three arbitrators, most commonly, each party
appoints one arbitrator,6 2 and either the parties, the two appointed
arbitrators, an arbitral institution, or an appointing authority selects
the presiding arbitrator.6 3
Conventional wisdom regarding arbitral decision making holds
that arbitrators, as private actors, know that their income generally
depends on their selection by parties. Market information can affect
their selection and reselection to arbitration tribunals and hence can
impact their judicial behavior.6 4 Since arbitrators act in a competitive
58
See Cooter, supra note 4, at 107 ("[Plrivate judges have to attract business, so they
are exposed to the same market pressures as anyone who sells a service.").
59
Christian Bflhring-Uhle, A Survey on Arbitrationand Settlement in InternationalBusiness
Disputes: Advantages of Arbitration, in TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:
COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, supra note 50, at 25, 33 (presenting results of a survey of
participants in international commercial arbitration on the reasons to choose arbitration
over litigation in which the most frequently cited reason was "the possibility for the parties
to select the members of the tribunal themselves" (italicization omitted)).
60
Robert B. Von Mehren, ConcludingRemarks, in THE ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
ARBITRATION BULLETIN: THE STATUS OF THE ARBITRATOR 126, 129 (Spec. Supplement 1995)
(noting that one commentator has said that "[t]he arbitrator is the sine qua non of the
arbitral process" and that "[t]he process cannot rise above the quality of the arbitrator").
61
Arbitration rules provide for the procedure for the appointment of arbitrators. See,
e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 13, arts. 37-40; UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res.
31/98, arts. 6-8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976); ARBITRATION INST. OF THE
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ARBITRATION RULES art. 13(1) (2010) [hereinafter
SCC ARBITRATION RULES]; INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RULES OF ARBITRATION arts. 8-9
(1998) [hereinafter ICC ARBITRATION RULES].
62
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Party-Appointed Arbitrator in International Controversies:
Some Reflections, 30 TEX. INT'L LJ. 59, 65 (1995) ("[T]he predominant practice, as reflected
in the most widely used rules, is to presume, or even to require, that if three arbitrators are
to be appointed, each party shall appoint or nominate one of the three.").
63
See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 13, arts. 37-38; UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules, supra note 61, arts. 7-8; SCC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 61, art. 13; ICC ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 61.
64
Franck, supra note 56, at 516; Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 37, 83 (1996).
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market, these market forces may lead them to behave in a way that
increases the parties' satisfaction in the arbitration process.6 5 Thus,
arbitrators may tend to grant decisions that will keep both parties satisfied so as to increase their probability of being reappointed in future
cases. 66 One such strategy is for arbitrators to "split the difference"that is, to render compromise awards that give each party a partial
victory.6 7
According to this approach, the concepts of disputants' risk and
loss aversion can explain the tendency by arbitrators to render compromise awards. 68 To satisfy both parties, arbitrators will tend to avoid
65 The literature on procedural justice suggests that one of the goals of the process is
the opportunity for parties to participate in the proceedings. A process before an impartial decision maker will increase the parties' satisfaction with the outcome. See, e.g., E.
ALLAN LIND & Tom R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE passim
(1988) (discussing empirical studies of procedural justice); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 94 (1975) (arguing that the disputants' satisfaction with the outcome of the dispute is affected by their satisfaction with
the dispute-resolution process); Tom R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 107-08 (1990)
(claiming that people are more likely to obey the law when they are confident that the
decision-making procedures are fair); Brower & Schill, supra note 33, at 494 (arguing that
the fact that the parties can participate in the appointment of arbitrators ensures the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration); Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice,78 S. CAL. L. REV.
181, 273-305 (2004) (discussing the value of participation). But see Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to FairProcess: The Problem With ContractarianTheories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L.
REV. 485, 504-18 (2003) (criticizing the various theories of procedural fairness).
66 Farber & Bazerman, supra note 5, at 822 ("[O]ne possible motivation for arbitrators is that they attempt to make awards that maximize the probability they will be hired in
subsequent cases . . . .").
67
See, e.g., POSNER, HowJUDGEs THINK, supra note 1, at 127-29; Bloom, supra note 5,
at 578 (discussing the belief that "conventional arbitration awards systematically tend to be
compromises between the parties' final positions" and noting that "it might be the case
that arbitrators often make decisions by reaching a mechanical compromise between the
parties' final offers, without paying much attention to the merits of the case"); Dammann
& Hansmann, supra note 4, at 34 ("[A]rbitrators are commonly chosen (directly or indirectly) and paid by the parties, giving the arbitrators an interest in rendering decisions that
will maximize the chances that they will be chosen again in future disputes. The result is
an incentive to render compromised judgments that do not badly offend either party.");
John V. O'Hara, Comment, The New Jersey Alternative ProcedureforDispute Resolution Act: Vanguard of a "BetterWay"?, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1723, 1743 (1988) ("Considering that the parties
normally select the arbitrators, and that the arbitrators only derive income when they work,
it does not require much imagination to realize that an arbitrator has a strong interest in
keeping everyone as happy as possible. The best method of accomplishing this is compromise; thus, in the typical arbitration, neither side is as likely to prevail as in the 'winnertake-all' style of adjudication." (footnote omitted)); Posner, Judicial Behavior, supra note 1,
at 1261 ("We can expect, therefore, a tendency for arbitrators to 'split the difference' in
their awards, that is, to try to give each side a partial victory (and therefore partial defeat)."); Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation,83 TEx. L. REV.
1581, 1594 (2005) (stating that "arbitrators are believed to tend toward middle-of-the-road
results (as otherwise they are unlikely to be selected for future arbitrations)").
See Rau, supra note 4, at 523 (arguing that arbitrator self-interest has "long been
68
familiar in collective bargaining cases" as "one explanation for the apparently common
practice of compromise awards" since "[r]epeat business for the arbitrator is likely only if
he is able to retain the future goodwill of both union and management"); Cass R. Sunstein,
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rendering "all or nothing" decisions and will instead prefer to grant
awards that are closer to the "middle ground" of the parties' contentions. 69 Since word-of-mouth information may influence the selection
of arbitrators, arbitrators who develop a reputation for favoring one
party or for granting extreme decisions will have a lower probability of
being selected in future cases. 70
Academics have further linked compromise awards to cognitive
biases, 7 ' such as anchoring 72 and extremeness aversion.73 It has been
Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, I Am. L. & ECON. REV. 115, 131-35 (1999)
(analyzing loss aversion and its implications).
69 Posner, judicial Behavior, supra note 1, at 1261.
70
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 18-32 (discussing the importance of building and exchanging symbolic capital to become a successful arbitrator).
71
See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY. HEURISTICS AND BIASES
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (presenting an overview of research regarding heuristics and biases used in everyday judgment); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (discussing how the assumptions of neoclassical economics that underlie economic analysis of law are flawed because they fail to
fully consider cognitive and motivational problems); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 135 (pointing out that cognitive biases can lead to inaccurate perceptions of facts); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124
(1974) (describing three heuristics used to assess probabilities and to predict values, discussing the biases these heuristics may lead to, and presenting theoretical and as-applied
implications of such biases). However, some scholars have argued that market forces have
a corrective effect on heuristics and cognitive biases. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1494 (1999) ("The literature on
[cognitive] illusions provides some basis for thinking that market settings tend to dispel or
at least reduce them . . . ."). But see Christopher R. Drahozal, A BehavioralAnalysis ofPrivate
judging,67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 126-28 (2004) (describing the different views on
the effect of market pressures on cognitive biases and concluding that the available empirical studies on market incentives and arbitral decision making are inconclusive).
72 "Anchoring" means people's tendency, when estimating a numerical amount, to
use any number they begin with as an "anchor" or base rate that influences their final
estimate. See Daniel T. Gilbert, Inferential Correction, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT,

supra note 71, at 167 (pointing out that "anchor-

ing . . . describes the process by which the human mind does virtually all of its inferential
work"); Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring,Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIo ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 597, 598 (2006) (conducting a
meta-analysis of studies that have tested the impact of an opening figure in a negotiation
experiment and finding that anchoring does have a powerful impact on negotiation outcomes); Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 71, at 1127-28 (describing the three basic heuristics as availability, representativeness, and anchoring). On anchoring in arbitration, see
Bloom, supra note 5, at 578 (arguing that conventional arbitrators have a systematic tendency to mechanically compromise between the parties' final offers with little additional
systematic reference to the facts of the case). Some experiments have found an anchoring
effect between the amount claimed and the amount awarded in mockjuries. See, e.g.,John
Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage
Amounts in PersonalInjuiy Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491, 495 (1989) (finding that jurors
awarded more money when the parties claimed more money); see also Verlin B. Hinsz &

Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for DamageAwards in a Mock Civil Trial 25J. APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHOL. 991, 1016 (1995) (finding that awarded damages tend to be close to the
damage limit); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom: The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 353, 361-66 (1999)
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argued that the positions taken by the parties may serve as an anchor
for the award rendered by the arbitrator.7 4 Extremeness aversion refers to a decision maker's aversion to being associated with granting
extreme decisions.7 5 Thus, to avoid such reputations, arbitrators may
tend to render compromise awards.
While some literature on arbitral awards has focused on the arbitrators' purported tendency to split the difference, another line of
studies argues that investment-treaty arbitrators tend to rule in favor
of investors.7 6 This tendency has been linked to various factors. Some
have claimed that, because ICSID arbitrators are predominantly nationals of capital-exporting countries, they may have a tendency to
rule in favor of investors.77 Others observe that this tendency is linked
to the unique characteristics of investment-treaty arbitration.78 Specifically, unlike commercial arbitrations where any of the parties is a po(finding that, as the level of the cap increased, the size and variability of punitive damage
awards increased as well).
73
See, e.g., Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25J. LEGAL
STun. 287, 287-318 (1996) (finding that, in the legal decision-making context, a decision
maker will evaluate the same option more favorably when it is intermediate rather than
extreme in the offered set (compromise) and when it is paired with a similar option that is
clearly inferior to it (contrast)); Sunstein, supra note 68, at 135 ("Extremeness aversion
gives rise to compromise effects." (italics omitted)).
74
Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND EcoNoMics 159, 176
(Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (stating that parties have incentives to
misrepresent or overrepresent their positions because they expect arbitrators to "split the
difference between their extreme demands").
75
See Sunstein, supra note 68, at 136 (discussing extremeness aversion and arguing
that lawyers should think about presenting alternatives to the decision maker, because, all
other things being equal, "juries and judges may well try to choose a compromise
solution").
76
Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, Who Wins and Who Loses in Investment Arbitration?
Are Investors and Host States on a Level Playing Field?, 6J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 69, 69
(2005) (noting that, in one sense, "host States cannot be winners in investment arbitration" because host states have no rights, only obligations, under BITs and regional investment treaties); Dailino, supra note 20 ("As the number of cases has grown, some have
developed a perception that there is not a level playing field between investors and
States."). But see Sandra L. Caruba, Resolving InternationalInvestment Disputes in a Globalised
World, 13 N.Z. Bus. L.Q. 128, 150-51 (2007) (claiming that, while in the past claimants had
a high degree of success in ICSID arbitration, "as the number of ICSID cases has increased,
the awards in favour of respondents are also becoming more common"); William W. Park,
ArbitratorIntegrity: The Transient and the Permanent, 46 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 629, 658 (2009)
(arguing that neither evidence nor logic supports the existence of arbitrators' incentives to
rule in favor of investors).
77
Daflino, supra note 20 (noting that "[a]nother concern which has been expressed
by a few is that ICSID arbitrators are predominantly nationals from developed countries,
the implication being that they may be more favorably inclined towards investors").
Franck has recently rebutted this claim with empirical research evaluating whether there is
a statistically significant relationship between the development status of respondent states,
the development status of presiding arbitrators, and the outcome of the dispute. See Susan
D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435,
473 (2009) (finding no statistically significant relationship).
78
VAN HARTEN, supra note 8, at 168-69.
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tential claimant, the process of investors filing claims and host states
defending those claims characterizes investment-treaty arbitration.7 9
One commentator argues that this special feature of investment-treaty
arbitration makes arbitrators dependent on prospective claimants who
initiate the arbitration process.80 Thus, because arbitration proceedings will be activated only if claimants file claims, arbitrators, who
know that their selection depends on cases being filed with ICSID,
may have an inclination to favor investors."'
In addition, other scholars have expressed some concern regarding the method by which ICSID officials select arbitrators. While
ICSID is an autonomous institution,8 2 some have questioned its independence.8 3 For example, a special feature of ICSID arbitration is the
Panel of Arbitrators. 84 Contracting states8 5 and the Chairman of the
ICSID Administrative Council8 6 designate the persons who comprise
the Panel. When the disputing parties fail to agree or fail to appoint
an arbitrator to a tribunal, the Chairman has the authority to make
the appointment.8 7 In such cases, the Chairman is restricted to appointing arbitrators from the Panel.88 Since the President of the
World Bank is the ex officio Chairman of the ICSID Administrative
Council,8 9 and thus arguably owes his or her position to major capitalexporting states, the Chairman may be inclined to appoint arbitrators
who share these states' ideologies. 90 Moreover, arbitrators who wish
79

Id. at 3-6 (describing the system of investment-treaty arbitration).

80

Id. at 5.

81 Id. at 172 ("The more investors see the system delivering benefits for them, the
more claims will be brought, and the more contracts will be available for arbitrators.").
82

About ICSID, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, http://icsid.worldbank.

org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=
AboutICSIDHome (last visited Sep. 20, 2010) ("ICSID is an autonomous international
institution established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States . . . .").
VAN HARTEN, supra note 8, at 169-70 (arguing that both the Chairman of the ICSID
83
Administrative Council and the ICSID Secretary-General, both of whom are responsible for
appointing ICSID arbitrators, owe their "position to the major capital-exporting states");
SARAH ANDERSON

& SARA GRUSKY,

CHALLENGING CORPORATE INVESTOR RULE: HOW THE

WORLD BANK'S INVESTMENT COURT, FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATIES HAVE UNLEASHED A NEW ERA OF CORPORATE POWER AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 5

(2007), http://documents.foodandwaterwatch.org/ICSID-web.pdf ("ICSID is not an independent organization.").
84
ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 3 ("The Centre ... shall maintain a Panel of
Conciliators and a Panel of Arbitrators.").
85
Each contracting state may designate four persons to the panel. Id. art. 13(1). In
this context, see Daflino supra note 20 (stressing the importance of the states' responsibility
"to ensure that only the best qualified and most experienced professionals are included in
their lists").
86
ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 13(2).
87
Id. art. 38.
88
Id. art. 40(1).
89
Id. art. 5.
90 See VAN HARTEN, supra note 8, at 169-71.
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to be selected by the Chairman in future disputes may behave in ways
that safeguard their reputation within the institution91 However, it is
necessary to note that the Chairman may only exercise discretion in
appointing an arbitrator when called upon to make such an
appointment. 92
Another major concern about arbitrators' behavior is the lack of
division in their roles as arbitrators in a given arbitration and as counsel in a different arbitration.9 3 Because many elite arbitrators have
established prestigious professional careers as practicing attorneys, it
is not uncommon for them to serve as an arbitrator in one case while
representing a disputing party as counsel in another case.9 4 This mixing of roles may affect these individuals' decision-making patterns.9 5
As convincing as these theories may seem, one could argue that,
in the international-arbitration market place, parties appoint arbitrators because of their professional credibility, standing, and reputation.9 6 While arbitrators who provide private adjudicative services
might, in theory, display a proinvestor bias or project some image of
fairness by choosing, strategically, to split the difference, they simply
may also wish to fulfill the parties' expectations for ajust and accurate
decision.9 7 According to this line of thought, the arbitrators' professional reputation could provide a key incentive for them to remain as
impartial and fair as possible. It, thus, could be crucial not only to
91
Id. at 169 ("Lacking tenure, arbitrators who wish to win future appointments to
tribunals have an interest in safeguarding their reputation among those who select arbitrators at the designated organizations."); Sornarajah, supra note 33, at 104 (claiming that, in
investment arbitration, "there has been a selective generation of principles that are geared
to ensure the protection of the ideological commitment to globalization and the maintenance of the power of global capital and the States generating them to the detriment of
the developing States of the world").
92
ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 38.
93
Daflino, supra note 20 (noting, in the context of expressing concerns about efficiency, that there are a relatively small number of arbitrators and that some arbitrators may
be further pressed for time because they also provide services as counsel or experts in
other cases).
94
See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 22-23 (discussing the career pattern of
William D. Rogers, a partner at the Washington, D.C. law firm Arnold & Porter, as an
example of one of the various paths to becoming and continuing to work as a successful
arbitrator); see also REED ET AL., supra note 34, at 80 (noting that "in practice, most ICSID
arbitrators are international lawyers").
95 See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)Ethical Are You?, HARv. Bus. REV., Dec.
2003, at 56 (discussing how conflicts of interest can unintentionally and unconsciously
skew decision making).
96
Brower & Schill, supra note 33, at 492 (arguing that the crucial factor in appointing
an arbitrator is the arbitrator's "reputation for impartial and independent judgment"); see
also DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 18-32 (discussing the importance of symbolic
capital for arbitrators).
97
Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 56, at 559-60 ("[A]rbitrators compete for business
and have an incentive to resolve disputes so as to enhance the governance benefits net of
dispute resolution costs to the contracting parties.").
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their future selection as arbitrators but also to other spheres of their
professional careers, whether as private counsel or as academics. In
order to promote their reputation, arbitrators may choose not to
render compromise awards but may choose to increase accuracy and
counter any real or perceived biases. This observation is especially
true for arbitrators who are repeat players in the arbitration market
and for those arbitrators whose reputation as credible and independent decision makers is a key characteristic for their selection."
If the theories behind the decision-making patterns of international arbitrators do not seem nuanced enough already, a comprehensive analysis of these patterns must further consider the effect of
interpanel dynamics and of the different roles played by arbitrators on
panel arbitration tribunals. Indeed, in high-stakes international arbitrations, the tribunal is often composed of three arbitrators.9 9 Scholarship on judicial decision making suggests that public judges sitting
on panels may award compromise decisions to accommodate the varying ideologies of the members of the panel;10 0 in fact, most judges do
not like to dissent because dissent frays collegiality.1 0 1 Dissent aversion may also occur in an arbitration tribunal. Because an arbitration
tribunal is a cooperative enterprise, an arbitrator disturbing the collegiality among the tribunal's members may affect that arbitrator's
reputation and selection in future disputes.
98 Franck, supra note 56, at 516-17.
99 See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 37(2) (b) (setting the default number of arbitrators at three).
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,83
100
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (arguing that the party affiliation of other judges sitting on
the panel significantly influences a judge's vote). On collegiality among judges and how
that affects the decision-making process, see generally Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and
Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit,84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335 (1998) (arguing that collegiality among appellate judges facilitates judicial decision making); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1639, 1640 (2003)
[hereinafter Edwards, Effects of Collegiality] (arguing that collegiality is the process by which
judges achieve greater value); Harry T. Edwards, The JudicialFunction and the Elusive Goal of
PrincipledDecisionmaking,1991 Wis. L. REv. 837, 858 (suggesting that collegiality assists with
principled decision making for judges in difficult cases).
See POSNER, How JUDGES THINK, supra note 1, at 32 (discussing why there is little
101
dissent within judicial panels); Stefanie A. Lindquist, Bureaucratizationand Balkanization:
The Origins and Effects of Decision-Making Norms in the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. RICH. L.
REv. 659, 695-96 (2007) (finding that, the more judges a federal court of appeals has, the
more frequent dissenting opinions are and suggesting that this phenomenon occurs because judges on larger courts are more likely to experience diminished collegiality and
thus be less sensitive to maintaining relationships with other judges); Russell Smyth, Do
judges Behave as Homo Economicus, and if so, Can We Measure TheirPerformance? An Antipodean Perspective on a Tournament ofjudges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1299, 1319 (2005) (identifying collegiality as a "generally agreed useful qualit[y]" in judicial performance). But see
Edwards, Effects of Collegiality, supra note 100, at 1656 (arguing against trying to quantify
judicial performance because collegiality is a qualitative variable that "involves mostly private personal interactions that are not readily susceptible to empirical study").
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Three-member arbitration panels exhibit another unique interpanel dynamic that stems from the varying roles that the arbitrators
play on the panel. The party-appointed arbitrator is often selected
due to his or her perceived predisposition to a party and its legal position. This arbitrator plays an especially important role, since he or
she often serves as a translator of the legal culture of the appointing
party. 10 2 Indeed, by being able to select this arbitrator, the disputing
parties obtain a sense of confidence in the arbitration tribunal,1 03 for
the arbitrator ensures that the case of the appointing party will receive
the appropriate attention and that other members of the tribunal will
understand that party's case. 104 Nevertheless, the party-appointed arbitrator is still expected to act independently and impartially.1 05
Thus, while the party-appointed arbitrator understands well that a
party selected him or her with a desire that he or she render a decision favorable to that party's claim, the arbitrator ultimately acts
under the duties of integrity, independence, and impartiality.
The presiding arbitrator on the tribunal is appointed either by
the parties, by the two party-appointed arbitrators, or by an arbitral
institution and plays a crucial role in interpanel dynamics as he or she
tries to encourage collegiality and build a consensus.1 0 6 To avoid the
fragmentation of the tribunal that dissenting opinions cause, the presiding arbitrator may try to persuade the party-appointed arbitrators
to render an award that reflects some compromise between their differing opinions.1 0 7
102
Lowenfeld, supra note 62, at 65 (claiming that, in international arbitrations, a partyappointed arbitrator serves as a translator of legal culture); see also Seth H. Lieberman,
Note, Something's Rotten in the State of Party-AppointedArbitration:Healing ADR's Black Eye That
Is "Nonneutral Neutrals," 5 CARDozo J. CONFucr RESOL. 215, 222 (2004) (arguing that an
important feature of international (as opposed to domestic) arbitration is that "the partyappointed arbitrator can often serve as a translator for his nominating party").
103
Doak Bishop & Lucy Reed, PracticalGuidelinesfor Interviewing, Selecting and Challenging Party-Appointed Arbitrators in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 395, 395
(1998) ("[E]ach side's selection of 'its' arbitrator is perhaps the single most determinative
step in the arbitration."); Lieberman, supra note 102, at 222 (stating that the party-appointed arbitrator can reinforce the counsel's confidence in the process).
104
Lowenfeld, supra note 62, at 65 (pointing out that one of the functions of partyappointed arbitrators is to give confidence to the appointing party and "promising (if not
assuring) a fair hearing and a considered decision"); Rau, supra note 4, at 498 (stating that
party-appointed arbitrators "can provide assurance [to the panel chairman] that he fully
understands the issues and background of the case, the contentions of each party, and the
possible implications of the award before it is issued").
105
M. Scott Donahey, The Independence and Neutrality of Arbitrators,J. Iwr'L ARB., Dec.
1992, at 31, 39.
106
See Rau, supra note 4, at 501 (discussing how the "neutral" chairman must work to
accommodate the positions of the parties' surrogates).
Hans Smit, Quo Vadis Arbitration? Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice,by Pieter Sanders,
107
11 Am. REv. INT'L ARB. 429, 429-30 (2000) (book review) (arguing that the chair of the
tribunal may realize that the appointment of the party-appointed arbitrator was motivated
by the desire that his or her selection would contribute to a favorable result for the ap-
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In the market for arbitration services, arbitrators sitting on panels
may adopt different behavioral patterns depending on their status in
this market. Arbitrators who form a part of a close group of elite arbitrators who are repeatedly appointed to serve on arbitration tribunals
may develop interpersonal dynamics that lead them to act collegially.
The more these arbitrators serve on arbitration tribunals and the
more intermingled they are in arbitration panels, the more one may
expect collegiality between them. One-shot arbitrators, however, may
display different behavioral patterns. The larger the pool of newcomers, the harder it is for these newcomers to be selected. Once these
newcomers are appointed, market pressure may lead them to behave
strategically by accentuating their uniqueness. In order to attract the
attention of prospective disputing parties, they may try to stand out
from the other members of the tribunal by rendering dissenting opinions. One could argue that the greater the market competition between newcomers, the greater the likelihood of variance in the
opinions of arbitration panels. In general, this argument suggests that
repeatedly appointed arbitrators are less likely to render dissenting
opinions than newcomers.
While the number of arbitrators serving in international arbitrations has grown in the past decades, 08 some commentators have
claimed that there is no real competitive and open arbitration market
for arbitration services, thus making it more difficult for newcomers to
enter the market. 0 9 Some have argued that an exclusive club of arbitrators dominates the international arbitration market.1 0 This purported group has a measure of influence over the appointment of
other arbitrators, mainly presiding arbitrators."' Party-appointed arbitrators who are pegged to select the presiding arbitrator may tend to
share the pie with other members of the club while expecting to be
pointing party and that it "may lead to an award that represents a compromise rather than
a straightforward decision on the merits"). Scholars have put forth a similar argument with
respect to chiefjudges. See Virginia A. Hettinger et al., The Role and Impact of ChiefJudges on
the United States Courts of Appeals, 24 JUST. SYs. J. 91, 100 (2003) (claiming that a chief judge
can encourage collegiality among the members of his circuit).
ICSID, in particular, has noted its efforts to enlarge and diversify the pool of arbi108
trators. See Daflino, supra note 20 (noting that "whenever possible we have also tried to
enlarge and diversify the pool of arbitrators who are normally involved in our cases").
109

DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 34-41 (claiming that the "key source of con-

flict" is between the influx of newcomers and the older arbitrators in international arbitration practice); Alan Scott Rau, "The Arbitrability Question Itself " 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 287,
365 n.218 (1999) (doubting the existence of strong competitive forces in the arbitration
market); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the InternationalArbitrator,20 Am. U. INT'L L.
REv. 957, 968 (2005) ("[T]he market for international arbitrators operates as a relatively
closed system that is difficult for newcomers to penetrate.").
110 Rogers, supra note 109, at 967 (stating that "the field continues to be dominated by
an elite group of insiders who are variously, though not without objection, referred to as a
'cartel,' a 'club,' or a 'mafia"' (footnote omitted)).
111 See, e.g., ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 37(2) (b).
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appointed by the selected arbitrator in future disputes. 1 2 Thus, interpersonal dynamics between the club members may influence arbitrators' behavior.1 3
III
ExiSTING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The emergence of investment-treaty disputes has generated growing academic interest in investment-treaty arbitrations.'1 4 However,
empirical research remains quite limited.1 15
Specifically, existing empirical studies mainly offer blunt descriptive data on investment-treaty arbitration, such as the number of arbitration cases, 116 the number of arbitrators,11 7 their nationality", and
gender,119 the nationality of the parties,120 the amounts awarded, 1 2 '
the costs of arbitration, 122 and the use of precedents in arbitration.12 3
In addition, one recent research project' 2 4 explores whether there is a
statistically significant 2 5 relationship between the development sta112
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 50 (quoting one international-arbitration
player: "'Now why is it a mafia? It's a mafia because people appoint one another. You
always appoint your friends-people you know;'" quoting another international arbitrator:
"'They nominate one another. And sometimes you're counsel and sometimes you're
arbitrator"').
113 Id. at 49:
The principal players therefore acquire a great familiarity with each other,
and they develop also, we suspect, a certain connivance with respect to the
role held by the adversary of the moment. The extraordinary flexibility of
this rotation of roles contributes greatly to the smooth running of these
mechanisms of arbitration. It promotes the reaching of acceptable awards
under a regime where the players do not speak of contradictions and antagonisms that, if formulated explicitly and disclosed, would create some
difficulties of legitimation.
(footnote omitted).
114
See generally DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 13 (discussing how rulings of international investment tribunals shape, in part, international investment law); VAN HARTEN,
supra note 8 (suggesting that some of the most important substantive developments in
international law are taking place in arbitral tribunals adjudicating BIT claims).
115 Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and InternationalLaw: Insightsfor Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 792-93 (2008) (suggesting that there is little empirical analysis of investment-treaty conflict).
116
Franck, supra note 10, at 44-47.
117
Id. at 77.
118
Franck, supra note 10, at 77-81; Noah Rubins et al., ICSID Arbitrators:Is There a Club
and Who Gets Invited?, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REv. 31 (2006).
119
Franck, supra note 10, at 81-83.
120
Id. at 26-33.
121
Id. at 55-66.
122
Id. at 66-70; Matthew Weiniger & Matthew Page, Treaty Arbitration and Investment
Disputes: Adding Up the Costs, I GLOBAL ARB. REV. 44 (2006).
123 Jeffery P. Commission, Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration:A Citation Analysis of
a DevelopingJurisprudence,24J. INT'L ARB. 129 (2007).
124
Franck, supra note 77.
125
For the definition of statistical significance, see id. at 438 n.15.
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tusi2 6 and outcome. Another project explores investment-arbitration
decisions on jurisdiction, 12 7 while a further research study analyzes
the legal reasoning of ICSID tribunals.128 While these studies offer
valuable information about the parties and their underlying disputes,
they lack the necessary particulars to assess and evaluate the arbitrators'
behavior and decision making. In fact, the studies evaluating arbitration awards have overlooked three elements necessary to assess arbitral behavior and decision patterns.
The first element concerns the relevance of repeat appointment
to the analysis of arbitral behavior. One study offers numerical data
about the amount claimed and the amount awarded in each arbitration case under analysis. 129 However, it does not ask whether repeatedly appointed arbitrators or newcomers granted the awards, and this
data is necessary for assessing claims about a possible connection between arbitrators' outcomes and their reselection. To make this point
clear, suppose that a dataset consists of 100 awards. These awards
could have been granted by 100 different arbitrators or by 10 arbitrators sitting in 10 arbitration cases each. As the previous Part explains,
the arbitrators' decision making may vary depending on their status as
repeat or one-shot arbitrators. For example, a one-shot arbitrator on
a panel might be more concerned about distinguishing him or herself, whereas a repeat arbitrator might be more interested in maintaining his or her established reputation as an impartial and accurate
decision maker. Ignoring such nuances and lumping all arbitrators
together while trying to pinpoint the elusive phenomenon of splitting
the difference may not lead to any conclusive results. In other words,
accounting for the number of times each arbitrator has been appointed may impact the assessment of his or her judicial behavior.
Thus, we should call into question the validity and credibility of the
conclusions about arbitrators' behavior when the underlying research
has not accounted for the repeat-appointment element.
The second element concerns the role of the arbitrators in threemember tribunals (as a presiding arbitrator or as one of the two partyappointed arbitrators). Current research does not explore whether
the decision patterns of presiding arbitrators and party-appointed arbitrators differ. One study even limits its analysis to presiding arbitrators and ignores party-appointed arbitrators altogether.1 30 Due to the
126 For the definition of the development dimension, see id. at 437 n.11.
127 Kathleen S. McArthur & Pablo A. Ormachea, InternationalInvestor-State Arbitration:
An EmpiricalAnalysis of ICSID Decisions on jurisdiction,28 REv. LITIc. 559 (2009).
128 Ole Kristian Fauchald, The Legal Reasoning oflCSID Tribunals-An EmpiricalAnalysis,
19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 301 (2008).

129
130

Franck, supra note 10, at 55-66.
Franck, supra note 77, at 438-39.
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different roles that presiding arbitrators and party-appointed arbitrators are expected to perform, their judicial behaviors may differ.
The third flaw of current empirical research concerns the dichotomous coding of the outcomes of arbitration proceedings. Empirical
research so far has coded the dependent variable of outcome according to a binary scale: either the claimant wins or the respondent
wins.1 31 According to this scale, the claimant wins if the claimant receives some monetary award, and the respondent wins only if the
claimant receives nothing. However, arbitration awards do not necessarily reflect dichotomous outcomes, as they do not always completely
favor one party. This binary categorization of outcome fails to reflect
the true range of outcomes in arbitration awards and cannot provide
accurate information about the winners and losers in arbitrations or
about arbitrators' judicial behavior. For instance, a recent study explored the potential association between the outcome, the development status of the respondent state, and the development status of the
presiding arbitrator, 13 2 ultimately finding no such association. 3 3
That research used a binary code for evaluating the outcome: the
claimant "lost" when all of his claims were dismissed and he received
no monetary award, and the claimant "won" if the tribunal awarded
him some monetary award.134 However, when millions of dollars are
at stake, the concept of some monetary award fails to provide an accurate proxy for a winning result. The present Article presents a more
nuanced outcome variable by dividing outcome into five categories.13 5
To conclude, the missing elements in current empirical studies
allow us to validly question their significance. The research in this
Article fills in these gaps and offers a more nuanced evaluation of the
judicial behavior of arbitrators that takes these elements into account.

IV
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research is to take the first step in evaluating
the decision patterns of arbitrators who repeatedly serve in ICSID
tribunals. This Article defines arbitrators who received at least four
131
See, e.g., id. at 456. For exceptions to this coding system outside the field of investment arbitration, see Stefanie A. Lindquist et al., Splitting the Difference: Modeling Appellate
Court Decisions with Mixed Outcomes, 41 LGw & Soc'Y REv. 429, 430 (2007) (arguing that
"court outcomes are not always structured so as to completely favor one party over the
other"); Splitting the Baby: A New AAA Study, AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N (Mar. 9, 2007), http://
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=32004 (dividing outcome into six categories).
132 Franck, supra note 77, at 454.
133

Id. at 464.

134 Thus, the study classified the outcome as in favor of the claimant when the claimant received more than 0% and less than 100% of the amount claimed, and it classified the
outcome as in favor of the respondent when the claimant received nil.
1s5
See infra Part IV.
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appointments to arbitration cases registered with ICSID from January
1994 and concluded by September 30, 2009 as repeatedly appointed
arbitrators.13 6 The term concluded cases includes all arbitration cases
that ended in one of the following ways: an award on the merits;13 7 an
award that embodied the parties' settlement pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 43(2);18 an order for the discontinuance of the proceed-

ings following the parties' settlement pursuant to ICSID Arbitration
Rule 43(1);139 an award on jurisdiction; 140 an order for the discontinuance of the proceedings at the request of a party pursuant to ICSID
Arbitration Rule 44;141 and an order for the discontinuance of the
proceedings for failure of the parties to act pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 45.142

A.

The Differentiation of Elite Arbitrators

This Article terms those arbitrators who received appointments at
least four times to cases registered and concluded during the period
under analysis as elite arbitrators. Arbitrators selected to serve on
136 The list of cases is from the ICSID's official website, which I lasted visited on October 3, 2009. The dataset excludes any award rendered after September 30, 2009 and any
award rendered before September 30, 2009 and not uploaded until after October 3, 2009.
See List of Concluded Cases, INT'L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, http://icsid.world
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtsRH&actionVal=ListConcluded
[hereinafter ICSID, Concluded Cases] (last visited Oct. 3, 2009).
137
ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 15, at r. 47(1) (i) (stating that the award shall
contain "the decision of the Tribunal on every question submitted to it, together with the
reasons upon which the decision is based").
138
Id. at r. 43(2) ("If the parties file with the Secretary-General the full and signed text
of their settlement and in writing request the Tribunal to embody such settlement in an
award, the Tribunal may record the settlement in the form of its award.").
139
Id. at r. 43(1) ("If, before the award is rendered, the parties agree on a settlement
of the dispute or otherwise to discontinue the proceeding, the Tribunal, or the SecretaryGeneral if the Tribunal has not yet been constituted, shall, at their written request, in an
order take note of the discontinuance of the proceeding.").
140
Id. at r. 41(6) ("If the Tribunal decides that the dispute is not within the jurisdiction of the Centre or not within its own competence, or that all claims are manifestly
without legal merit, it shall render an award to that effect.").
141
Id. at r. 44:

142

If a party requests the discontinuance of the proceeding, the Tribunal, or
the Secretary-General if the Tribunal has not yet been constituted, shall in
an order fix a time limit within which the other party may state whether it
opposes the discontinuance. If no objection is made in writing within the
time limit, the other party shall be deemed to have acquiesced in the discontinuance and the Tribunal, or if appropriate the Secretary-General,
shall in an order take note of the discontinuance of the proceeding. If
objection is made, the proceeding shall continue.
Id. at r. 45:
If the parties fail to take any steps in the proceeding during six consecutive
months or such period as they may agree with the approval of the Tribunal,
or of the Secretary-General if the Tribunal has not yet been constituted,
they shall be deemed to have discontinued the proceeding and the Tribunal, or if appropriate the Secretary-General, shall, after notice to the parties, in an order take note of the discontinuance.
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ICSID tribunals less than four times are termed ordinary arbitrators.
The decision to distinguish arbitrators who served on at least four
cases is based on the following reasons: During the period under analysis, there were 144 concluded arbitration cases. Of those 144 cases,
13 were discontinued before the arbitration tribunal was constituted.1 4 3 A total of 175 arbitrators were appointed in the remaining
131 cases. Of these 175 arbitrators, 26 were appointed at least four
times, 18 were appointed three times, 24 were appointed twice, and
107 were appointed once. Therefore, arbitrators appointed at least
four times represent 14.9% of the arbitrator population. While this
percentage seems low, these arbitrators' presence in the total number
of concluded cases is impressive: at least one elite arbitrator was present in 105 of the 131 concluded cases-that is, in 80.2% of the concluded cases.
The decision to exclude arbitrators who were appointed only
three times to cases registered and concluded during the period
under analysis is due to their limited impact on the dataset. Adding
the arbitrators who were appointed three times to serve on ICSID
tribunals to the dataset raises the number of arbitrators by 69.2%
(from 26 to 44). However, the increase in the number of cases due to
their addition is marginal-only 10.5% (from 105 to 116). Of the 11
cases of arbitrators appointed three times, only four ended with an
award on the merits, which is the subject of this research. In these
four cases, there were only five arbitrators who were appointed three
times-that is, of the 18 arbitrators appointed three times, only five
would be added to the list of elite arbitrators. Therefore, this marginal addition does not justify including these arbitrators in the dataset.
This Article explores the decision patterns of elite arbitrators during a period of fifteen years, from the mid-1990's to 2009. I chose this
period because in this time frame, the number of arbitration cases
registered with ICSID increased dramaticallyl 4 4 and because these
cases will enable an appropriate updated evaluation of the decision
patterns of those arbitrators who were active in the field of investment
disputes during this critical period.
This Article explores decision patterns on three levels: the tribunal level, the appointment-status level, and the individual level. On
the tribunal level, this research explores the decision patterns of all
publicly available awards on the merits that arbitration tribunals consisting of at least one elite arbitrator granted. On the appointment143
These cases were discontinued pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 43(1) or 44.
See id. at rs. 43(1), 44.
144
Since the 1990's, there has been an increase in ICSID arbitration cases. See THE
WORLD BANK, supra note 23, at 179; Franck, supra note 10, at 46; McArthur & Ormachea,
supra note 127, at 569-70.
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status level, this Article assesses the decision pattern of elite arbitrators
as a function of their role on the arbitration tribunal (as presiding
arbitrators or as party-appointed arbitrators). Given the unique role
of presiding arbitrators in the arbitration process, this Article further
considers the average number of settlements that the disputing parties
reached in arbitration cases chaired by elite arbitrators. On the individual level, this Article analyzes the decision patterns of individual
elite arbitrators over time.
B.

The Unit of Analysis and the Coding Method

The findings of this research are based on a dataset generated
from the concluded cases section of the official ICSID website1 45 and
from publicly available awards1 46 rendered in cases registered with ICSID from January 1994 and concluded by September 2009. The research isolates variables linked with elite arbitrators and analyzes the
impact of these variables on the outcome of the dispute. This research lists all arbitrators appointed in cases registered and concluded
during the period under analysis. Upon the identification of all elite
arbitrators, I generated a list of all concluded cases of tribunals comprised of at least one elite arbitrator (elite concluded cases). The research generated a dataset for elite concluded cases, and this dataset
was presented in cross tabulation for independent and dependent
variables using a coding method.
1. Independent Vaiables
The independent variables of this study are as follows:
* Name of elite arbitrator associated with concluded case
number.
* Number of times each elite arbitrator was appointed.
* Role of the elite arbitrator: presiding arbitrator (=1), party-appointed arbitrator (=2), and sole arbitrator (=3).
* Public availability of awards on the merits: publicly available
awards (=1) and publicly unavailable awards (=0).
* Status of party-appointed arbitrators in publicly available
awards on the merits: arbitrator appointed by the claimant (=0)
and arbitrator appointed by the respondent (=1).147
See ICSID, Concluded Cases, supra note 136.
The dataset was finalized by October 3, 2009. The unit of analysis excludes any
award published after that date. Awards were gathered from printed materials and from
the following sources: Awards and Decisions: 2009, INv. Culms, http://www.investment
claims.com/SubscriberAwards by Date?year-2009 (last visited Oct. 3, 2009); Chronological
Listing, INv. TRrATY ARBITRATION, http://ita.law.uvic.ca/chronologicalj1ist.htm (last visited
Oct. 3, 2009); ICSID, Concluded Cases, supra note 136.
147
Data was generated from descriptions of appointment procedures in all publicly
available awards on the merits. In two cases, only excerpts of the award on the merits were
145

146
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Dependent Variables

The dependent variables of this study are as follows:
* Manner of conclusion of the arbitration case, using the following
coding method: award on the merits (=1); settlement of the parties, including awards embodying the parties' settlements (=2);
award on jurisdiction (=3); order for the discontinuance of the
proceeding not pursuant to settlement (=4).
* Outcome: the analysis differentiated publicly available awards on
the merits by the percentage of the amount claimed that the
claimant recovered (the ratio of the amount awarded divided by
amount claimed and multiplied by 100).148 This percentage generated a dependent variable termed "outcome" and coded as follows: award for 100% of amount claimed (=0); award for 0% of
amount claimed (=1); award for less than 40% and more than 0%
of the amount claimed (=2); award between 40% and 60% of the
amount claimed (=3); award for more than 60% and less than
100% of the amount claimed (=4). The level of acceptance of the
claim was based on the monetary award rendered as a percentage
of the amount claimed.
V
DATABASE OVERVIEW

This Part provides descriptive quantitative information about the
arbitration cases analyzed by this study. As the previous Part explains,
144 arbitration cases concluded during the period under analysis. Of
the 144 cases, 13 were discontinued before the arbitration tribunal
was constituted;14 9 these cases were therefore excluded from the unit
of analysis. Of the remaining 131 cases, 124 cases had a three-member tribunal and 7 cases had a sole arbitrator. In total, 175 arbitrators
were appointed in these 131 cases. Of the 175 arbitrators, 26 were
elite arbitrators and 149 were ordinary arbitrators (18 were appointed
three times, 24 were appointed twice, and 107 were appointed once).
Therefore, elite arbitrators represent 14.9% of the population of
arbitrators.
As highlighted above, while the percentage of elite arbitrators
seems low, their presence in the total number of cases is impressive;
there was at least one elite arbitrator appointed in 105 of the 131 conpublicly available. The excerpts did not provide information about the arbitrators' appointment procedures. In one case, a party-appointed elite arbitrator was kind enough to
provide us with information about his role in the tribunal. In the other case, the cell was
coded as unavailable. Cells in all other concluded cases were left unmarked.
148 Postaward interest was discarded in this category.
149 These were discontinued pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rules 43(1) or 44. See
supra notes 139 and 141.
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cluded cases-that is, in 80.2% of the cases. Of these 105 cases, 103
had a three-member tribunal and 2 had a sole arbitrator. Interestingly, 9 cases comprised of a panel of three elite arbitrators, 47 cases
had two elite arbitrators in the tribunal, and 47 cases had one elite
arbitrator as a member of the tribunal. In sum, there were 170 appointments of elite arbitrators in all elite-arbitration cases. It is thus
clear that there is indeed a general tendency towards repeat appointments of elite arbitrators. 15 0
Seventy-four of the 103 elite-arbitration cases that comprised of a
three-member tribunal had an elite presiding arbitrator (71.8%), and
29 had an ordinary presiding arbitrator. This statistic clearly shows
the prevalence of appointments of elite arbitrators as presiding arbitrators. Interestingly, this tendency reverses when examining the total
number of arbitration cases chaired by a sole arbitrator. Of the 7 arbitration cases with a sole arbitrator, only 2 cases had sole elite
arbitrators.
The notable presence of elite arbitrators in a large number of
arbitration tribunals clearly illustrates the necessity to investigate their
purported exclusive club and to draw conclusions about their judicial
behavior and decision patterns.
A.

Basic Distribution of Elite-Arbitration Cases

Of the 105 concluded elite-arbitration cases, 50 were finally resolved by an award on the merits (47.6%), 35 were settled (33.3%), 11
were concluded by an award on jurisdiction (10.5%), and 9 cases were
discontinued pursuant to ICSID Arbitration Rule 44151 or 45152
(8.6%). Figure 1 displays the distribution of elite-arbitration cases.

150
Rubins et al., supra note 118 ("There is a natural tendency towards the appointment of 'repeat players' arising from the need tojustify a candidate in terms of experience
and reputation.").
151
See supra note 141.
152
See supra note 142.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Elite-Arbitration Cases
Of the 50 elite cases concluded by an award on the merits, 43
awards were publicly available (86% of final awards on the merits).153
In general, analyzing the decision patterns in only published awards
may be subject to a case-selection bias, as the awards available in the
public domain may not be representative of all awards on the merits.
However, given that the valid data represents such a high percentage
of all awards on the merits rendered during the period under analysis
and 100% of all publicly available awards on the merits at the time I
finalized the dataset, the findings of this research likely provide a
strong indication about the judicial behavior and decision patterns of
elite arbitrators.
B.

The Characteristics of Elite Arbitrators

Several commentators have made claims about the profile and
characteristics of international arbitrators. They have argued that international arbitrators form part of a closed homogenous group comprised of "grand old men"154 and nationals of developed countries. 15 5
They have been described as "blue chip men," 15 6 part of a closely-knit
153
Rule 48(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules provides that the parties' consent is necessary for making an award public. The Rule adds, however, that ICSID shall "promptly
include in its publications excerpts of the legal reasoning of the Tribunal." ICSID ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 15, at r. 48(4).
154
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 34; Rogers, supra note 109, at 963 (noting that
"[t]he forefathers of the modern international arbitrator were a small, intimate group of
European 'grand notables' or 'Grand Old Men,' as they were sometimes called").
155
K.V.S.K. Nathan, Well, Why Did You Not Get the Right Arbitrator?, MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
REP., July 2000, at 24, 24 (claiming that the international arbitral establishment is "white,
male and English speaking," "controlled by institutions based in the United States, England and mainland European Union," and that the majority of arbitrators in a multimember international arbitration tribunal "[are] always white").
156
Michael D. Goldhaber, DecidingWomen, Am. LAWYER (July 1, 2009), http://www.law.
com/jsp/PubArticlejsp?id=1202431685880 (referring to male arbitrators who are repeatedly appointed to serve in international tribunals).
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group, 15 7 or even an arbitration "mafia." 15 8 A common claim is that
there is a lack of female arbitrators' 5 9 in this gentlemen's club.16 0
These hypotheses have not gone unchallenged. One author argued that the large number of appointed arbitrators in the investment-treaty arbitrations that she analyzed 1 6 ' begins to rebut the claim
that arbitration is a "mafia." 1 6 2 This claim, however, is based on a simple count of the number of arbitrators appointed to serve in the investment-arbitration tribunals at issue. This study does not examine a
critical aspect necessary to evaluate the exclusivity of the arbitrators'
club-namely, the number of arbitrators who were repeatedly appointed to serve in more than one arbitration tribunal.'6 3 The high
prevalence of elite arbitrators in the dataset under consideration in
the present Article tends to support the "elite" status of such
arbitrators.
Within the elite group of arbitrators, one arbitrator was appointed 11 times, three were appointed 10 times, four arbitrators were
appointed 9 times, one arbitrator was appointed 8 times, two were
appointed 7 times, four arbitrators were appointed 6 times, three were
appointed 5 times, and eight arbitrators were appointed 4 times.
Bearing in mind that 80.2% of all concluded cases included at least
one elite arbitrator, there is clearly a solid group of elite arbitrators
who receive repeated appointments to ICSID tribunals.
The claim that arbitrators form an exclusive club necessitates an
examination of the major characteristics of its members. Of the 26
elite arbitrators, only 2 (7.7%) were women. However, on average,
157 Christian Bfthring-Uhle et al., The Arbitrator as Mediator Some Recent Empirical Insights, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 81, 81-82 (2003) (claiming that there are between 100 and 200
practitioners worldwide with significant repeat experience who form "a closely-knit, discreet community of very busy people").
158 While the term "mafia" may inply criminal activity and corruption, it has been
widely used to describe a closed, exclusive arbitrators' club. .On the use of the term, see
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 10; Franck, supra note 10, at 75; William W. Park,
National Legal Systems and PrivateDispute Resolution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 616, 623-24 (1988)
(reviewing three books by practitioners) (referring to the "international arbitration mafia"); Goldhaber, supra note 156.
159 Louise Barrington, Arbitral Women: A Study of Women in InternationalCommercialArbitration, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE: THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE
CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 229, 229-41 (Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell ed.,
1997) (commenting on the lack of women in international arbitration); Nathan, supra
note 155, at 24 (interpreting an arbitrator's commentary as suggesting that "women simply
do not or cannot satisfy" the criteria for selecting arbitrators); Goldhaber, supra note 156
(arguing that women arbitrators represent only four percent of all arbitrators).
160 See Rubins et al., supra note 118 (describing claims and criticism about ICSID).
161
The author surveyed 145 arbitrators in 102 awards from 82 different arbitrations.
162 Franck, supra note 10, at 77.
163
The article acknowledges this shortcoming, stating that "[t]he substantive impact
of repeat appointments should be analyzed thoroughly in the future." Id.
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these women have been repeatedly appointed to more tribunals (9.5)
than male elite arbitrators (6.29).
Elite arbitrators came from 16 countries.16 4 Their typical professional profile includes a combination of private practice and academic
positions. Some elite arbitrators are highly respected practitioners or
academics, others combine academic positions and private practice,
and some are retired judges with academic credentials. While the majority of elite male arbitrators are leading private practitioners, interestingly, the two elite female arbitrators are leading law professors.
As to the selection of arbitrators, three out of 26 elite arbitrators
were only appointed as presiding arbitrators (number of appointments = 12) and four were never appointed as presiding arbitrators
(number of appointments = 17). Three arbitrators were appointed as
chairmen in more than 80% of the cases they were appointed to
(number of appointments = 27), while seven arbitrators were selected
as party-appointed arbitrators in more than 80% of the cases they
were selected to (number of appointments = 45). Thus, more than
half of elite arbitrators are either mainly appointed as party-appointed
arbitrators or as presiding arbitrators.
VI
RESEARCH RESULTS-DECISION PATTERNS
OF

ELITE

ARBITRATORS

The international arbitrators' marketplace has expanded alongside the increased number of international investment disputes.1 65 As
the number of arbitrators appointed to serve in arbitration tribunals
has grown, competition between arbitrators has become more robust.
The lucrative arbitrators' market attracts many newcomers who wish
to have a share of the arbitration pie.16 6 By serving on international
tribunals, arbitrators gain personal and professional prestige as well as
the reputation and credibility to improve their professional standing
and financial state.1 67 As a result of the increased competition between potential arbitrators, scholars argue that market forces may lead
these arbitrators to display behavioral patterns that increase the
164 The nationality of arbitrators was determined through information gathered from
ICSID's official website and through Google Search. France (n=5), Canada (n=3), Switzerland (n=2), United States (n=2), India, United Kingdom, Chile, Spain, Philippines,
Netherlands, Mexico, Italy, Germany, Australia, Egypt, and Costa Rica (each n=1). Twentyone arbitrators came from OECD countries. For empirical research on the association
between development status of presiding arbitrators, respondent states, and outcome, see
Franck, supra note 77.
165
See supra Part 1.
166
See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 43 (discussing the expansion of the
market and new arrivals into the market).
167
Id. at 18-29 (discussing building and maintaining the symbolic capital required to
succeed as an international arbitrator).
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probability of their selection to future cases. 16 8 Some commentators
claim that arbitrators may choose to grant decisions that will keep
both parties satisfied-that is, to render compromise awards.16 9 Some
argue that arbitrators may be inclined to rule in favor of investors.170
These commentators attribute this inclination to both the fact that
international arbitrators are mostly nationals of capital-exporting
states, who might be more inclined to favor investors coming from
these countries, 7' and to the peculiar characteristic of ICSID arbitration procedures whereby only investors can initiate arbitrations.17 2 As
a consequence of these procedures, some claim that arbitrators who
want to increase their chances of being reappointed may wish to make
investors feel that their claims will be upheld. 173 Others express further concern over a possible tendency that investment arbitrators
whom ICSID officials appoint may adopt a decision-making pattern
that will be in line with the underlying ideology of capital-exporting
states.17 4
This Part presents the research results. As explained above, I
conducted the analysis on three levels: the tribunal level, the appointment-status level, and the individual level.
A.

The Tribunal Level: What is the Decision Pattern of EliteArbitration Awards on the Merits?

This subpart explores whether arbitration awards by tribunals
that consist of at least one elite arbitrator display any particular decision pattern in ruling on the merits. For the purpose of this section,
the awards dataset included 43 publicly available awards on the merits
that emanate from 43 elite-arbitration cases.' 7 5 Figure 2 displays the
distribution of awards by ICSID elite tribunals as a percentage of the
amount claimed.

168

See supra Part IL

169
170
171
172

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

See VAN HARTEN, supra note 8, at 172-73.
Id. at 169-70.
175
Of the 43 cases, 42 had a three-member tribunal and I had a sole elite arbitrator.
Of the 42 three-member tribunals, 20 had one elite arbitrator in the tribunal, 18 cases had
two elite members, and 4 cases had three elite arbitrators.
173

174
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Figure 2: Distribution of Awards on the Merits (n=4 3)
Of the 43 publicly available awards, 26 (60.5%) denied the claimant any recovery and 3 (7%) awarded the claimant 100% of the
amount claimed. The claimant received some monetary award in the
remaining 14 awards. Interestingly, only one award split the difference by awarding the claimant a sum ranging between 40% and 60%
of the claimed amount. The results thus show that arbitration tribunals involving elite arbitrators do not have a tendency to render compromise awards. Moreover, since most awards dismissed all investors'
claims and more than 80% of all decisions rendered an award of less
than 40% of the amount claimed, the results clearly do not support
the claim that investment-arbitration tribunals display a tendency to
rule in favor of investors.
The Appointment-Status Level: What Is the Decision Pattern
of Elite Arbitrators as a Function of Their Role in the
Tribunal?
7 6 Of
Three-member tribunals generally hear ICSID arbitrations.
the 43 publicly available elite cases that were concluded by an award
on the merits, a tribunal panel consisting of three arbitrators heard all
but one of the cases. The common method for appointing arbitrators
to such a tribunal calls upon each party to appoint an arbitrator and
for the chair of the tribunal to be appointed either by the mutual
agreement of the parties,1 7 7 by the party-appointed arbitrators, or by
the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council.1 78 When the
B.

176

ICSID Convention, supra note 13, art. 37(2)(b).

177

Id.

178

Id. art. 38.
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Chairman is called upon to appoint an arbitrator, he or she is restricted in his or her choice to the members of the ICSID Panel of
Arbitrators.1 7 9 However, when the parties select an arbitrator, they
are free to appoint arbitrators from outside the Panel provided that
these arbitrators possess the same qualities required of the arbitrators
on the Panel: being of high moral character; recognized as competent
in the fields of law, commerce, industry, or finance; and capable of
exercising independent judgment.1 8 0
In the 43 arbitration cases with publicly available awards on the
merits, there were a total of 69 appointments of elite arbitrators: 16
appointments by claimants, 19 appointments by respondent states, 33
appointments of presiding arbitrators, and 1 appointment of a sole
arbitrator. Of the 33 appointments of presiding arbitrators, the parties and party-appointed arbitrators each made 9 appointments, and
ICSID made 15 appointments.
The following figure displays the distribution of awards as a function of the arbitrators' roles in the tribunal-presiding arbitrators (including one sole arbitrator), claimant-appointed arbitrators, and
respondent-appointed arbitrators.
70%
60%
u

50%
0

40% 50 30%-

6
u

20%

~10%
0%_
0%

0%>40%

40%>60% 60%>100%

100%
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O Appointed by
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O Appointed by
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Figure 3: Distribution of Elite-ArbitratorAwards by Appointment Status
(n=69)
179
Id. art. 40(1). The panel of arbitrators consists of a list of individuals nominated by
contracting states and by ICSID. Each contracting state may designate up to 4 arbitrators
to the panel, while the chairman of ICSID may designate up to 10 individuals. Id. art. 13.
180 Id. arts. 14(1), 40(2).
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Figure 3 shows that elite presiding arbitrators tend to dismiss all
claims (64.7%) more often than elite arbitrators appointed by
claimants (43.7%) or by respondents (57.9%). It also shows that only
elite presiding arbitrators have awarded claimants 100% of the
amount claimed. As to the partially accepted claims, the figure shows
that elite arbitrators appointed by claimants tend to accept part of the
claims (56.3%) more than elite arbitrators appointed by respondents
(42.1%) and more than elite presiding arbitrators (26.5%).
Interestingly, while one might expect that presiding arbitrators
may be more inclined than party-appointed arbitrators to satisfy both
parties by rendering compromise awards and by avoiding extreme
decisions, 8 1 the results show the opposite. Indeed, presiding
arbitrators dismiss all claims or accept all claims more than partyappointed arbitrators and therefore appear less averse to extreme
outcomes than party-appointed arbitrators. The party-appointed
arbitrators' purposeful efforts to be perceived as no less impartial than
the chairpersons may explain these puzzling results. Specifically, to
avoid a reputation of favoritism towards any of the parties, partyappointed arbitrators might tend to render decisions that are on the
middle ground more than presiding arbitrators. Following this line of
thought, these arbitrators may have an incentive to craft awards that
both parties will consider fair. 182
While presiding arbitrators are less averse to extreme decisions
than party-appointed arbitrators, arbitrators appointed by
respondents display decision patterns that more closely resemble
those of presiding arbitrators than those of claimant-appointed
arbitrators. In fact, claimant-appointed arbitrators are more inclined
to award claimants something than are arbitrators appointed by
respondents or presiding arbitrators. Although the differences in
decision patterns as a function of the appointment status are
apparent, it is clear that the results do not display a tendency by any
group of arbitrators to grant compromise awards or to rule in favor of
investors.18 3
Not only do presiding arbitrators have an important role in trying
to reconcile the opposing opinions of the party-appointed arbitrators,
but they also may have an impact on the parties' tendency to settle. A
presiding arbitrator's suggestion of settlement to the parties may
affect the parties' perceptions regarding their probability of
181 For a discussion of compromise awards, anchoring, and extremeness aversion, see
supra Part II. For an account of how presiding arbitrators may be more likely to favor
compromise awards, see supra notes 10O-07 and accompanying text.
182 For a discussion of the scholarship regarding arbitrators' perceived tendency to
grant compromise awards, see supra Part I.
183 For a discussion of the scholarship regarding arbitrators' perceived tendency to
rule in favor of investors, see supra Part II.
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prevailing. For example, such a suggestion may signal to the parties
that the tribunal does not see the case to be as clear-cut as the parties
may think and that, as a matter of efficiency, the parties should
consider the option of settling their dispute before the tribunal
renders its decision.1 8 4 We have seen that of the 105 concluded elitearbitration cases, the parties settled in 35 of these cases (33.3%). Elite
arbitrators presided over 22 (62.9%) of these 35 settled cases. In
order to further understand the phenomena of settlements, this
research explored whether a correlation exists between the number of
appointments of elite arbitrators as chairmen and the average number
of settlements that disputing parties have reached in the cases in
which these arbitrators have presided. Figure 4 displays the results.
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Figure 4: Average Number of Settlements as Function of the Number of
Appointments of PresidingElite Arbitrators (n=2 2 )
Figure 4 presents an interesting pattern: the higher the number
of appointments as presiding arbitrators, the lower the average
number of settlements per cases. Put differently, as the number of
tribunals chaired by an elite arbitrator rises, the average number of
settlements in those cases falls. 185 This Article, however, could not
identify a specific pattern of settlements in multiple appointments
184
For a discussion of how procedure and judicial management of the procedure of a
case may affect the parties' approaches and strategies, see, for example, LIND & TYLER,
supra note 65, at 14-15 (discussing how various factors-for example, severe time
pressure-may affect the parties' conception of the desirability of certain types of thirdparty intervention); THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 65, at 6-21 (discussing choice of
procedure and under what circumstances a decision might need to be externally
imposed).
These two variables are significantly negatively correlated (r = -0.86; p < 0.05).
185
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pursuant to a timeline. For example, the research does not reveal
whether most settlements have been reached in the first or last cases
over which elite arbitrators have presided. No clear conclusions could
therefore be made regarding a possible association between the
number of appointments of elite arbitrators as chairmen and the
number or rate of settlements that disputed parties reached.
C.

The Individual Level: The Decision Pattern of Individual
Arbitrators on a Timeline

Pursuing arbitration might pose a high risk for the disputing parties.186 The selection of arbitrators, however, may endow the parties
with a measure of confidence in the tribunal and in the arbitration
process.' 8 7 By opting for arbitration, the parties retain the opportunity to choose arbitrators to hear their case and decide its merits. This
opportunity represents one of the great advantages of arbitration over
litigation.18 8 It is of even greater importance in high-stakes international disputes, which involve parties from different legal systems and
cultures. 8 9
Since the parties receive the possibility of selecting the judges
who will resolve their dispute, prospective arbitrators who compete in
the market for appointments might wish to behave in a way that increases their chances of appointment. Arbitrators may therefore have
an incentive to signal to prospective disputants that they would benefit
from appointing these arbitrators. 9 0
When parties consider the selection of arbitrators, they gather information about each prospective candidate. 19 ' This information
assists the parties in their selection. Such information may include
the arbitrators' professional background and affiliation, their experience as counsel in similar disputes,19 2 their professional and academic
publications, their nationality, and, most importantly, their past expeSee supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Brower & Schill, supra note 33, at 494 (suggesting that the parties' participation in appointing arbitrators helps ensure the legitimacy of investor-state arbitration).
188 Bfihring-Uhle, supra note 59, at 33 (presenting results of a survey of participants in
international commercial arbitration on the reasons to choose arbitration over litigation in
which the most frequently cited reason was "the possibility for the parties to select the
members of the tribunal themselves" (italicization omitted)).
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
189
190
For a discussion of the scholarship regarding the judicial behavior of arbitrators,
see supra Part II.
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 57, at 18 (noting that international lawyers must
191
constantly evaluate the statute and authority of potential arbitrators to "see who will have
clout" with other arbitrators and with the parties).
192 The mixing of roles between arbitrator and counsel has raised some concern. See
ANDERSON & GRUSKY, supra note 83, at 8-9 (arguing that the lack of separation between the
role of judge and lawyer in arbitration creates the perception of conflict of interest and
possibly an actual conflict of interest); Daflino supra note 20 ("Arbitrators are increasingly
186

187
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rience in deciding similar cases.19 3 Additionally, an arbitrator's longterm reputation will influence the parties' decision whether to appoint him or her. 1 9 4 By exploring the arbitrators' decision history, the
parties gain more insight into each arbitrator's judicial behavior and
decision patterns.
Arbitrators who compete in the arbitration market might act strategically by signaling their judicial attitudes to prospective parties.
Awards are strong signals, and as such, they might affect the disputing
parties' choice whether or not to select a specific arbitrator.19 5 Furthermore, arbitrators do not limit their signals solely to published
awards. Arbitrators may publish academic or professional papers and
opinions, or they may also represent investors as counsel in similar
arbitrations. Elite arbitrators, many of whom have prestigious professional careers as practicing attorneys, commonly serve as arbitrators in
one case while representing a disputing party as counsel in another
case. 196
Table 1 displays in chronological order a list of all awards on the
merits rendered by each individual elite arbitrator whose first award
was rendered during the period under analysis. The table enables us
to explore each individual arbitrator's judicial behavior and decision
pattern over time. Of the 26 elite arbitrators, 6 had rendered awards
prior toJanuary 1994 and were therefore excluded from the list. One
elite arbitrator had never granted an award on the merits and was also
not included in the list. There remain 19 elite arbitrators who had
rendered their first award during the period under analysis. Of them,
one had rendered 6 awards on the merits, one had rendered 5 awards,
three had rendered 4 awards, five had rendered 3 awards, three had
rendered 2 awards, and six had rendered just one award on the
ments.

For each of the 19 arbitrators, the table displays his or her role in
the tribunal for each arbitration concluded by an award on the merits
exposing themselves to challenges for potential conflicts arising from their roles as arbitrators and counsel in different cases before ICSID.").
193
Orley Ashenfelter, Arbitration and the Negotiation Process: Arbitrator Behavior, 77 Am.
ECON. REV. 342, 342 (1987) ("The evidence suggests that a key determinant of the parties
preferences for an arbitrator is usually the extent of the arbitrator's 'experience' in deciding related arbitration cases.").
194 Emilia Onyema, Empirically Determined Factorsin Appointing Arbitratorsin International
Commercial Arbitration, 73 ARBYTRKrON 199, 204-05 (2007) (describing results of a study
requiring respondents to rank the factors affecting choice of arbitrators and finding that
the most highly ranked factors, in order, are reputation, subject-matter expertise, recommendations of external counsel, knowledge of relevant language, and knowledge of applicable law).
195 See Tonja Jacobi, The JudicialSignaling Game: How Judges Shape TheirDockets, 16 Sur.
CT. ECON. REV. 1, 11 (2008) (noting, in the litigation context, that "[i]n the judicial signaling game, judges are like sellers, and litigants are like buyers").
196 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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and also displays the outcome of the dispute as a percentage of
amount claimed. The coding used for the role of arbitrators in
tribunals is as follows: pr. = presiding arbitrator; cl. = arbitrator
pointed by the claimant; and res. = arbitrator appointed by
respondent.
TABLE
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1: CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF AwARDs ON THE MERITS PER
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Table 1 exhibits some compelling results. In 12 of the 19 first
awards (63.1%), the claimant received nil. In these first awards, 6 of
the 9 presiding arbitrators, 5 of the 6 respondent-appointed arbitrators, and 1 of the 4 claimant-appointed arbitrators dismissed all
claims. Clearly, the tendency to dismiss all claims is stronger in presiding arbitrators and respondent-appointed arbitrators than in claimantappointed arbitrators. In 6 of the 19 first awards (31.6%), the claimant received less than 40% than the amount claimed (presiding arbitrators granted 2 of these awards, claimant-appointed

arbitrators

granted 3, and a respondent-appointed arbitrator granted one).
the remaining award (5.3%) rendered by a presiding arbitrator,
claimant received 100% of the amount claimed.
The arbitrators' decision records, examined individually, do
always display a tendency towards a balanced decision pattern.
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example, when appointed by the claimant, arbitrator number 2
awarded the claimant a partial monetary award in the first three
awards (27.3%, 53.6%, and 29.9%). In the fourth award, the same
arbitrator dismissed all claims when acting as a respondent-appointed
arbitrator. While this sequence of awards might suggest bias in favor
of the appointing party, this arbitrator dismissed all claims in the fifth
award when serving as a claimant-appointed arbitrator. Thus, if the
first three awards insinuate favoritism towards the claimant, then the
fourth award balances out such perceived favoritism.
Arbitrator number 3 acted as presiding arbitrator in all four cases
concluded by an award on the merits and granted the claimant high
monetary sums in each case (100%, 100%, 53.6% and 77.3%). In contrast, arbitrator number 8, who also acted as presiding arbitrator in
the three cases concluded by an award on the merits, dismissed all
claims in all three awards. It may be argued that the decision pattern
of arbitrator number 3 might display a bias toward claimants, while
the decision pattern of arbitrator number 8 might show a bias toward
respondents.
Arbitrator number 6, who also rendered awards on the merits
only as the presiding arbitrator, displays a more balanced decision pattern. Specifically, in the first two cases, the arbitrator dismissed all
claims, while in the third case, that pattern was changed by an award
of a high monetary sum (66%).
Arbitrator number 5 displays a balanced decision pattern on a
timeline. In the first two awards, the arbitrator acted as the presiding
arbitrator, awarding the claimant a partial compensation in one case
(39.7%) and nothing in the second case (0%). In the third and
fourth arbitrations, the arbitrator acted as the claimant-appointed arbitrator. In the third award, the arbitrator awarded the claimant nothing (0%) while granting granted the claimant a high monetary award
(77.3%) in the forth arbitration.
Arbitrator number 4 acted three times as the presiding arbitrator,
awarding the claimant nothing in all three cases; however, when appointed by the claimant, the arbitrator awarded the claimant some
monetary compensation (10%).
While in some cases the individual arbitrators' decisions may imply favoritism for one side over the other, the results above display
different decision patterns for each individual elite arbitrator. However, the results clearly show that elite individual arbitrators do not
tend to split the difference and that, with the exception of one arbitrator, they do not have a tendency to rule in favor of investors. Having
said this, it is worth noting that this study explores the decision pattern of arbitrators based only on the monetary awards granted. The
research does not explore the legal reasoning of the arbitrators'
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awards. Future research should explore whether some elite arbitrators tend to adhere to specific legal positions or reasoning, thereby
displaying a decision pattern that might affect the outcome.
CONCLUSION

In a field where disputing parties enjoy the possibility of selecting
the judges who will resolve their dispute and where the selection of
the arbitrators may be the most important single task the parties
face,1 9 7 the study of arbitrators' behavior is of great importance. This
Article contributes to the empirical literature on arbitrators' judicial
behavior in general and on investment arbitrators in particular by focusing on the decision-making patterns of a group of arbitrators who
tend to dominate this field. By distinguishing elite arbitrators as a
group and differentiating between the different roles that arbitrators
play on a tribunal, this research has sought to present a more nuanced
understanding of arbitral decision making. In the process, this research has undermined conventional wisdom regarding arbitrators'
judicial behavior.
By serving on international tribunals, arbitrators gain personal
and professional prestige and a favorable reputation and credibility.
In addition, they improve their professional standing and, ultimately,
their financial status. Arbitrators who compete in the arbitration market might act strategically by signaling their judicial attitudes to prospective parties. Conventional wisdom holds that, as competing
private actors, arbitrators may behave in a way that increases the parties' satisfaction in the arbitration process and in the decision arbitrators render. In other words, they would tend to split the difference
and award each party a partial victory. An alternative accepted view
holds that investment-treaty arbitrators tend to rule in favor of investors. Because an arbitrator's public record of awards sends a powerful
signal, one might expect that the types of decision making that these
theories implicate would be most evident among those arbitrators who
have served on multiple tribunals or that, as arbitrators' records grow,
an average tendency would emerge to support these theories.
197

See, e.g., Gerald Aksen, The Tribunal's Appointment, in
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31, 31 (Lawrence W. Newman & Richard D. Hill
eds., 2004) ("That selecting the tribunal is the most important decision to be made in any
international arbitration (apart from the rendering of the actual award) is, by now, a
clich. It also still happens to be true."); William W. Park, Income Tax Treaty Arbitration, 10
GEO. MASON L. REv. 803, 813 (2002) ('just as in real estate the three key elements are
'location, location, location,' so in arbitration the applicable trinity is 'arbitrator, arbitrator, arbitrator."'); Claude R. Thomson & Annie M. Finn, Managingan InternationalArbitration:A PracticalPerspective, Disp. RESOL. J., May/July 2005, at 74, 77 ("[T]he selection of
the 'right' arbitrator is absolutely essential.").
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The research presented in this Article empirically and systematically controverts the conventional wisdom. It reveals that there is indeed a group of select arbitrators who serve repeatedly on tribunals.
The research presents clear evidence that arbitration tribunals involving elite arbitrators do not have a tendency to render compromise
awards. The results also clearly defy any claim that investment-arbitration tribunals tend to rule in favor of investors. The research also
shows that, contrary to what one might expect, elite presiding arbitrators are less averse to extreme outcomes than party-appointed arbitrators. Then, having highlighted remarkable differences in decision
patterns as a function of the appointment status, the research results
still display no tendency by any group of arbitrators to grant compromise awards or to rule in favor of investors. Finally, the research
shows that arbitrators' decision records, examined individually, do not
always display a tendency towards a balanced decision pattern.
My claim is that the arbitrators' valuable professional reputation
could be a key incentive for them to remain impartial. Impartiality
critically affects not only their future selection as arbitrators but also
other spheres of their professional careers, whether as private counsel
or as academics. In order to promote their reputation, arbitrators
may choose to increase accuracy and to counter any real or perceived
biases rather than to cater to any particular interests. This tendency
rings especially true for repeat arbitrators in the arbitration market,
whose most valuable trait may be their reputation as credible and independent decision makers.

